Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court by Greenawalt, Alexander K.A.
Pace University
DigitalCommons@Pace
Pace Law Faculty Publications School of Law
2009
Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative
Justice, and the International Criminal Court
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, agreenawalt@law.pace.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty
Part of the Courts Commons, Criminal Law Commons, and the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Faculty Publications by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, Alternative Justice, and the International Criminal Court, 50 Va. J.
Int'l L. 107 (2009), http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/lawfaculty/627/.
  
Complementarity in Crisis: Uganda, 
Alternative Justice, and the International 
Criminal Court 
ALEXANDER K.A. GREENAWALT* 
 
Introduction .......................................................................................... 108 
I. Background: The ICC Arrest Warrants.. ................................... 111 
II. Uganda and the Rome Statute.. ................................................. 121 
 A. Article 17: Complementarity ........................................... 122 
  1. Text ........................................................................ 123 
  2. Problems ................................................................ 124 
   a. “Genuine” Investigations and  
    Prosecutions ................................................ 125 
   b. Individual Justice Versus Collective  
    Justice ......................................................... 131 
 B. Article 53: Interests of Justice ......................................... 132 
III. Legitimacy and Prosecutorial Policy ......................................... 134 
 A. The Limits of Guidelines ................................................. 137 
1. The Theoretical Challenge of Guidelines ............. 137 
2. Guidelines at the ICC ........................................... 140 
   a. The 2003 Policy Paper................................ 141 
   b. The September 2007 “Interests of Justice” 
                                                          
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University School of Law; Princeton University, A.B. 
1994; Yale University, M.A. (History) 1997; Columbia Law School, J.D. 2000. For their com-
ments on earlier drafts of this Article, the author would like to thank Guyora Binder, Luis Chiesa, 
Claire Gilman, Andrei Greenawalt, Kent Greenawalt, Tonya Putnam, John Setear, Sonja Starr, 
and Lesley Wexler; as well as the participants of the May 2007 Sokol Colloquium at the Univer-
sity of Virginia and the April 2008 Victims and the Criminal Justice System Symposium at Pace 
Law School for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article. The author is also indebted to the 
editors of the Virginia Journal of International Law for their careful work on this piece. 
108 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 50:1 
    Paper ........................................................... 144 
 B. Outsourcing Discretion .................................................... 145 
1. Pragmatic Accountability to NGOs and UN 
Officials ................................................................ 146 
2. Listening to the Victims ....................................... 147 
3. Judicializing Discretion ........................................ 151 
4. The UN Security Council ..................................... 153 
Conclusion: What kind of International Criminal Court? ................... 159 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, the government of Uganda has been engaged in peace 
talks with the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to end the nation’s 
devastating civil war. By most accounts, the talks have represented the 
best chance yet to realize a conclusive end to the twenty-year conflict, 
but negotiations have frequently stalled because of the still unresolved 
question of accountability for serious crimes.1 In 2005, the International 
Criminal Court (ICC or Court) issued arrest warrants for a handful of 
LRA leaders accused of crimes against humanity and other grave of-
fenses.2 Although it was Uganda that initially referred the matter to the 
ICC,3 the government later took the position that it would seek with-
drawal of the ICC warrants if the accused agreed to undergo a tradition-
al tribal justice ritual that requires a public confession and an apology 
without threat of incarceration.4 More recent developments in Uganda 
indicate a plan to supplement traditional justice with more formal court 
proceedings for those accused of the most serious crimes. However, it 
                                                          
1. See infra Part II. 
2. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Is-
sued on 8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005 (Sept. 27, 2005), available at 
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97185.PDF [hereinafter Kony Warrant]; Prosecutor v. 
Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Vincent Otti (July 8, 2005), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97189.PDF [hereinafter Otti Warrant]; Prosecutor v. Kony, 
Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Okot Odhiambo (July 8, 2005), available at 
http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97197.PDF [hereinafter Odhiambo Warrant]; Prosecutor 
v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Dominic Ongwen (July 8, 2005), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97201.PDF [hereinafter Ongwen Warrant]; 
Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Raska Lukwiya (July 8, 
2005), available at http://www2.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc97193.PDF [hereinafter Lukwiya 
Warrant]. 
3. Press Release, Int’l Criminal Court, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the 
Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) to the ICC, ICC-20040129-44 (Jan. 29, 2004), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/Go?id=04d961fa-a963-4b7e-9ce0-e8a0ebf95822&lan=en-GB. 
4. See Adrian Croft, Uganda Offers “Blood Settlement” to LRA Rebels, REUTERS, Mar. 12, 
2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/featuredCrisis/idUSL11891647. 
2009] COMPLEMENTARITY IN CRISIS 109 
remains unclear whether this formality shall be accompanied by more 
meaningful punishment. How the ICC will respond to a request for de-
ference to local justice also remains unresolved, and the LRA has pre-
viously maintained that it will not surrender until the ICC withdraws the 
warrants. Indeed, the LRA has repeatedly blamed the ICC’s failure to 
do so for the breakdown of negotiations.5 
In an earlier article dealing with prosecutorial discretion and the ICC, 
I argued that the particular structure and context of the Court imposes 
fundamental policy dilemmas on the ICC prosecutor that go to the core 
of the ICC’s goals.6 These dilemmas cannot be resolved by reference to 
existing legal standards or those standards created by the ICC’s consti-
tutive treaty, colloquially known as the Rome Statute.7 The Ugandan 
peace process presents the ICC with its first crisis of this kind. On one 
level, this episode reflects a classic dilemma of transitional justice, rais-
ing the oft-debated question of whether, and to what extent, criminal 
justice may be compromised for the sake of peace. When viewed 
through the particular framework of the ICC, however, the episode rais-
es a distinct set of difficult institutional problems. Unlike predecessor 
international criminal tribunals created on an ad hoc basis to address 
specific historical events,8 the ICC is a standing tribunal with broad 
temporal and geographic jurisdiction,9 staffed by prosecutors and judges 
authorized to pursue many cases without the formal consent of any out-
                                                          
5. See Jeffrey Gettleman, Uganda Peace Hinges on Amnesty for Brutality, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
15, 2006, at A1. 
6. Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics: Prosecutorial Discretion and the In-
ternational Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 583 (2007). 
7. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 [herei-
nafter Rome Statute]. 
8. Tribunals created on an ad hoc basis include the International Military Tribunals in Nu-
remberg and Tokyo established by the Allied powers to prosecute international crimes committed 
by the defeated Axis powers during World War II, as well as those created by the UN Security 
Council to prosecute international crimes committed during the 1990s in the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C. Res. 955, art. 1, U.N. 
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (granting jurisdiction over 
international crimes “committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for 
such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States between 1 January 1994 and 31 
December 1994”); Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, art. 
1, S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (Feb. 22, 1993) (ex-
tending jurisdiction to “serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the ter-
ritory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991”); Charter of the International Military Tribunal for 
the Far East, art. 1, Jan. 19, 1946, T.I.A.S. No. 1589 (establishing a tribunal “for the just and 
prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals in the Far East”); Charter of the Interna-
tional Military Tribunal, art. 1, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279 (establishing a tri-
bunal “for the just and prompt trial and punishment of the major war criminals of the European 
Axis”). 
9. The Court’s jurisdiction extends to war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide 
committed after the Statute’s entry into force in 2002. Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 5, 11. 
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side actor.10 The Court’s unusual measure of institutional independence 
ostensibly was intended to depoliticize the business of international 
criminal justice by leaving the law to the lawyers. By contrast, past tri-
bunals relied on political bodies, such as the UN Security Council, for 
their jurisdiction in individual cases.11 
As the Uganda crisis reveals, however, this transfer of formal au-
thority has failed to produce meaningful criteria dictating how exactly 
the ICC should exercise its authority. To put it more specifically, we are 
often told that the ICC—with its prominent framework of “complemen-
tary” jurisdiction—is a last resort, designed to intervene only when na-
tional legal systems fail.12 As indicated by the Ugandan experience, 
however, the Rome Statute leaves unanswered fundamental questions 
about how far states recovering from mass violence should be required 
to go in pursuit of criminal justice.13 
These observations require a recharacterization of the ICC as it is 
commonly perceived. While the Court is a criminal tribunal charged 
with the prosecution of individual suspects, it is also empowered, as a 
necessary incident of its prosecutorial power, with broad administrative 
policy discretion to evaluate the adequacy of transitional justice policies 
undertaken by states in which crimes under the Court’s jurisdiction have 
                                                          
10. For crimes committed on a state party’s territory or by a state party national, the prosecu-
tor may initiate investigations and seek arrest warrants based either on the referral of a state party 
or on his own authority. Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 12–15. Otherwise, the Court requires a 
referral from the UN Security Council to proceed. Id. art. 13(b). 
11. Although the United States lobbied to have all ICC cases be contingent upon an initial UN 
Security Council referral, a group of so-called “like-minded” states prevailed in securing the 
ICC’s existing referral system that grants greater authority to the Court itself. WILLIAM A. 
SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 15–20 (1st ed. 2001). 
The “like-minded” states defended this position by emphasizing that the ICC must be driven by 
legal considerations rather than political influence. See Ad Hoc Comm. on the Establishment of 
an Int’l Criminal Court, Report, ¶ 121, U.N. Doc. A/50/22 (Sept. 6, 1995) [hereinafter Ad Hoc 
Comm. on ICC Report] (reporting worries that mandatory Security Council referral “would re-
duce the credibility and moral authority of the court; excessively limit its role; . . . [and] introduce 
an inappropriate political influence over the functioning of the institution”). This position also 
drew strong support from representatives of nongovernmental organizations who played a critical 
role in defining and supporting the agenda of the “like-minded” states. See William R. Pace & 
Mark Thieroff, Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations, in THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 391, 
392–93 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999) (noting that “[m]any governments, the Secretary-General, other 
United Nations officials and media experts have commented on the decisive role of NGOs at the 
Rome Conference”). 
12. See, e.g., Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor, Int’l Criminal Court, Address at Nuremberg: 
Building a Future on Peace and Justice (June 24–25, 2007), available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/4E466EDB-2B38-4BAF-AF5F-005461711149/143825/LMO_nuremberg 
_20070625_English.pdf [hereinafter Moreno-Ocampo Address at Nuremberg] (explaining that “a 
system of complementarity was designed whereby the Court intervenes as a last resort, when 
States are unable or unwilling to act”). 
13. See Rome Statute, supra note 7. 
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occurred. This administrative quality of the Court’s work poses difficult 
institutional dilemmas that receive no explicit attention in the text of the 
Rome Statute and seem to play no role in the traditional rationales in-
voked to justify the Court’s creation. Indeed, the problem goes to the 
very heart of the Court’s legitimacy as a supranational institution autho-
rized to override the efforts of states, to whose populations the Court is 
not democratically accountable. To the extent that many critical deci-
sions are therefore not guided by meaningful legal criteria, has the 
Rome Statute delegated decisional authority to the wrong actors? Which 
policies, if any, should the ICC’s prosecutors and judges adopt to ad-
dress these challenges? 
In this Article, I take up these questions through a focused analysis of 
the Uganda prosecutions, considering both the interpretive dilemmas 
facing the Court and the efforts of Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to 
address them. Part I provides a summary of events leading to the LRA 
arrest warrants and the recent peace negotiations. Part II turns to the text 
of the Rome Statute, with a focus on Article 19’s framework for com-
plementary jurisdiction14 and the Article 53 dictate that “interests of jus-
tice” may trump the admissibility of investigations and cases that oth-
erwise meet all relevant statutory criteria.15 Although the ICC is 
structured to give deference to domestic proceedings, application of 
these provisions to the Ugandan peace process reveals deep uncertain-
ties regarding the ICC’s core relationship to domestic governance. Part 
III explores how these uncertainties upset standard rationales for the 
Court’s creation and looks to Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo’s response to 
the Ugandan peace process, focusing both on the failure of existing pro-
secutorial guidelines to address the situation adequately and on the pos-
sibility of relying on various other actors to resolve the Ugandan di-
lemma. In the Conclusion, I consider different conceptions of the Court 
that emerge from my discussion. I conclude that the Ugandan peace 
process reveals the Court to be a promising but unstable institution, one 
whose legitimacy may ironically depend on help from external stake-
holders, including the very political actor—the UN Security Council—
whose importance the Rome Statute was designed, in part, to diminish. 
I. BACKGROUND: THE ICC ARREST WARRANTS 
For the last twenty years, the LRA has been engaged in an armed 
conflict against the government of Uganda.16 Led by Joseph Kony, a 
                                                          
14. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 19. 
15. Id. art. 53. 
16. For a general account of the LRA’s rise, see TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE 
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self-professed “spirit medium” who claims he will rule Uganda accord-
ing to the Ten Commandments, the LRA has been responsible for wide-
spread atrocities. The group has primarily targeted Uganda’s ethnic 
Acholi who populate the Acholiland region of northern Uganda where 
the insurgency initially took root and whose interests the LRA claims to 
protect. Under Kony’s leadership, the LRA has been responsible for the 
forced abduction, conscription, and abuse of tens of thousands of child-
ren, who at times have comprised as much as eighty-five percent of the 
group’s forces.17 Reports paint a grim picture of these abductees’ treat-
ment. According to one ICC document, the children are 
used as soldiers, porters, labourers and sexual slaves in the case 
of girls. As part of initiation into the rebel movement, abducted 
children are forced into committing inhuman acts, including ri-
tual killing and mutilations. The total number of abducted child-
ren is reported to be over 20,000. Children are reported frequent-
ly beaten and forced to carry heavy loads over long distances, 
loot and burn houses, beat and kill civilians and fellow abduc-
tees, and abduct other children.18 
LRA gunmen have also been responsible for indiscriminate murder, 
mutilation, torture, and rape of civilians, as well as widespread destruc-
tion of property. These atrocities, moreover, have produced a corres-
ponding humanitarian crisis in northern Uganda, where somewhere 
around one million residents—as much as seventy-five percent of the 
population in these districts—have been displaced. To avoid abduction, 
thousands of other children have become “night dwellers,” leaving their 
villages only at night and “walking large numbers of kilometres to re-
group in centres run by non-governmental organisations, on the streets, 
on shop verandas, on church grounds, and in local factories heading 
back to their villages at dawn.”19 
Over the last several years, the Ugandan government has pursued 
multiple strategies to end the war. In addition to military efforts, the 
government passed legislation in early 2000 offering blanket amnesty to 
any LRA member who agreed to surrender and renounce involvement 
with the rebellion.20 A seven-member Amnesty Commission is respon-
                                                                                                                                      
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE LORD’S RESISTANCE ARMY (2006). 
17. Int’l Criminal Court, Background Information on the Situation in Uganda (Jan. 29, 2004), 
available at http://www.pambazuka.org/en/category/rights/19769 [hereinafter Background Infor-
mation] (note that the ICC removed the original background information document from its web-
site before this Article went to print); cf. ALLEN, supra note 16, at 63 (questioning the eighty-five 
percent statistic, but noting that “[t]he scale of child abduction has been terrible”). 
18. Background Information, supra note 17. 
19. Id. 
20. Amnesty Act, 2000 ch. 294 § 3 (2000) (Uganda), available at http://www.ulii.org/ 
2009] COMPLEMENTARITY IN CRISIS 113 
sible for the administration of the statute.21 As of August 2008, at least 
12,481 former LRA rebels had reportedly received amnesty under the 
Act.22 Those receiving amnesty have included both low-level perpetra-
tors and high-level LRA commanders.23 
In June 2002, the Ugandan government ratified the Rome Statute.24 
This action allowed the ICC prosecutor, acting either on his own initia-
tive or at the referral of a treaty party, to commence investigations and 
prosecutions of specified international crimes committed by Ugandan 
citizens or on Ugandan soil after the treaty’s July 1, 2002 effective 
date.25 With atrocities continuing, Uganda formally referred the LRA’s 
crimes to the ICC in January 2004.26 The ICC prosecutor duly initiated 
an investigation and, in July 2005, procured arrest warrants for Joseph 
Kony and four other LRA leaders,27 two of whom, according to reports, 
have since died.28 
The Ugandan investigation was a landmark event in several respects. 
It represented the first time a state party had referred a situation to the 
ICC, and the resulting warrants were the first that the ICC issued.29 De-
                                                                                                                                      
ug/legis/consol_act/aa2000294120/. 
21. Id. §§ 6–8. 
22. Zahra Abigaba & Grace Matsiko, Government Pardons 23,000 Rebels, DAILY MONITOR 
(Kampala), Aug. 12, 2008, available at http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/ 
Government_pardons_23_000_rebels_69.719.shtml. The article also indicates that the total num-
ber of amnesties under the Act is close to 23,000 when all Ugandan rebel groups are counted. Id. 
23. OFFICE OF THE UN HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, MAKING PEACE OUR OWN: 
VICTIMS’ PERCEPTIONS OF ACCOUNTABILITY, RECONCILIATION AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE IN 
NORTHERN UGANDA 27 (2007) [hereinafter MAKING PEACE OUR OWN]. 
24. See ICC – Uganda, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/states+parties/African+States/ 
Uganda.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009). 
25. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 11. Pursuant to Article 126, the Rome Statute entered into 
force sixty days after the date of deposit of the sixtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, ap-
proval, or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations. Id. art. 126; see also Leila 
Nadya Sadat, The International Criminal Court Treaty Enters Into Force, ASIL INSIGHTS (April 
2002), available at http://www.asil.org/insigh86.cfm. As of June 1, 2009, the ICC had 110 mem-
bers. ICC – The States Parties to the Rome Statute, http://www2.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ASP/ 
states+parties/The+States+Parties+to+the+Rome+Statute.htm (last visited Sept. 19, 2009) [herei-
nafter States Parties to the Rome Statute]. 
26. Press Release, supra note 3. 
27. See Kony Warrant, supra note 2; Otti Warrant, supra note 2; Odhiambo Warrant, supra 
note 2; Ongwen Warrant, supra note 2; Lukwiya Warrant, supra note 2. 
28. The Court has formally withdrawn Raska Lukiwya’s warrant on account of his death. 
Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Prosecution’s Request that the Warrant of Arrest 
for Raska Lukwiya Be Withdrawn and Rendered Without Effect Because of His Death (Mar. 22, 
2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc297257.pdf. The LRA has reportedly 
executed Vincent Otti upon Kony’s order, but the warrant against him remains. See Uganda's 
LRA Confirm Otti Death, BBC NEWS, Jan. 23, 2008, available at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ 
africa/7204278.stm. 
29. See generally Mahnoush Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, Developments at the Interna-
tional Criminal Court: The Law-In-Action of the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 
385 (2005); William Schabas, First Prosecutions at the International Criminal Court, 27 HUM. 
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spite Moreno-Ocampo’s receptiveness to the referral, the warrants 
raised questions about the scope of Article 17 of the Rome Statute, 
which renders inadmissible cases “being investigated or prosecuted by a 
State which has jurisdiction over it unless the State is unwilling or una-
ble genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”30 As Mahn-
oush H. Arsanjani and W. Michael Reisman have observed, the drafters 
of the Rome Statute generally conceived of the Court as a check on re-
calcitrant states rather than as a mechanism by which states would vo-
luntarily cede jurisdiction over domestic legal matters.31 
Although the LRA suspects all remain at large, the ICC referral and 
arrest warrants are credited—along with a reversal of military fortune—
in bringing the LRA to the negotiating table.32 In the summer of 2006, a 
peace agreement seemed within reach as the government of Southern 
Sudan began brokering talks in Juba, Sudan between the LRA and the 
Ugandan government. The Juba talks produced a unilateral ceasefire by 
the LRA, followed by a truce agreement between the parties. After a 
temporary breakdown caused by the LRA’s withdrawal, negotiations 
resumed in 2007, with regional observers from Kenya, Tanzania, Mo-
zambique, DR Congo, and South Africa participating.33 
While I am hesitant to reduce the negotiating difficulties to a single 
factor, news reports have consistently portrayed the ICC’s involvement 
as a major stumbling block.34 Not surprisingly, the LRA leadership has 
insisted on immunity from ICC prosecution.35 The Ugandan govern-
ment, for its part, has shown a willingness to compromise and consider 
                                                                                                                                      
RTS. L.J. 25 (2006). 
30. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 17(1)(a). 
31. Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 29, at 387. A state that proactively refers a case to the 
ICC would hardly seem “unwilling” to prosecute, and the Rome Statute’s provision for “inabili-
ty” seems to contemplate more than Uganda’s lack of success thus far in apprehending the sus-
pects. Article 17(3) of the Rome Statute provides that “[i]n order to determine inability in a par-
ticular case, the Court shall consider whether, due to a total or substantial collapse or 
unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable to obtain the accused or the ne-
cessary evidence and testimony or otherwise unable to carry out its proceedings.” Rome Statute, 
supra note 7, art. 17(3); see also JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME 
STATUTE AND NATIONAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 213 (2008) (“If one considers this practice 
of auto-referrals, one cannot fail to notice its tension with the formal framework of complemen-
tarity in general and the procedural setting of complementarity in particular.”). 
32. See, e.g., INT’L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA REPORT NO. 124, NORTHERN UGANDA: SEIZING 
THE OPPORTUNITY FOR PEACE ii (2007), available at http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/ 
documents/africa/central_africa/124_northern_uganda_seizing_the_opportunity_for_peace.pdf. 
33. See INT’L CRISIS GROUP, AFRICA BRIEFING NO. 46, NORTHERN UGANDA PEACE 
PROCESS: THE NEED TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM 2 (2007), available at 
http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/africa/central_africa/b46_north._uganda_peace_ 
process___need_to_maintain_momentum.pdf. 
34. See, e.g., Gettleman, supra note 5, at A1. 
35. Id. 
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various alternatives to ICC prosecutions, or indeed to conventional 
criminal justice. Much discussion has focused on Ugandan proposals to 
confront LRA abuses through the deployment of traditional informal 
dispute resolution methods historically relied upon by Uganda’s various 
peoples to mete out justice at the local village level.36 Indeed, traditional 
justice measures already have provided a method of integrating return-
ing LRA members into their communities. These efforts have received 
the encouragement of Uganda’s Amnesty Commission, acting under its 
statutory duty “to consider and promote appropriate reconciliation me-
chanisms in the affected areas.”37 Although traditional justice appears to 
enjoy some formal role within the Ugandan legal system as a general 
method of resolving cases referred by local courts,38 the transplantation 
of justice to the village setting is marked both by the informality of the 
procedure employed and by a focus on monetary compensation and re-
conciliation rather than more severe criminal sanctions. According to 
one study of traditional justice in Acholi culture, the “most important” 
aspects of traditional justice are “the establishment of truth, the volunta-
ry nature of the process (particularly on the behalf of the offender), the 
payment of compensation to restore what was lost, and finally the resto-
ration of social relations and unity of the family and clans.”39 Given the 
                                                          
36. See id.; Emmy Allio, Felix Osike & John Odyek, Kony Must Confess, THE NEW VISION 
(Kampala), Feb. 21, 2007, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/13/550389; Croft, supra 
note 4 (quoting Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni as saying that “what we have said in the 
agreement is that instead of using this formal Western type of justice we are going to use the tra-
ditional justice, a traditional blood settlement mechanism”); Indictments Not on Talks Agenda, 
Says Rugunda, NEW VISION (Kampala), Apr. 20, 2007, available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/ 
D/8/13/560996/Rugunda (quoting Uganda internal affairs minister Ruhakana Rugunda as stating 
that “[o]ur position on the court indictments is that, the government will engage the ICC after a 
final peace agreement (is reached) and after the LRA have undergone the traditional justice sys-
tem of mato-oput”); see also SCOTT WORDEN, U.S. INST. OF PEACE, THE JUSTICE DILEMMA IN 
UGANDA (2008), available at http://library.usip.org/articles/1011526.977/1.PDF. 
37. Amnesty Act, 2000 ch. 294 § 8 (2000) (Uganda), available at http://www.ulii.org/ug/ 
legis/consol_act/aa2000294120/; see also Barney Afako, Reconciliation and Justice: Mato Oput 
and the Amnesty Act, ACCORD, 2002, at 64, 67, available at http://www.c-r.org/our-
work/accord/northern-uganda/reconciliation-justice.php (noting that the Amnesty Commission 
has been supportive of initiatives to employ traditional Acholi rituals as a means of promoting 
reconciliation). 
38. According to one study, traditional local courts often will refer ordinary cases—both civil 
and criminal—within their jurisdiction to traditional leaders and elders, including matters involv-
ing “petty theft, instances of kiir (breaking cultural norms), incest, domestic violence, land dis-
putes, and, in some cases—murder—if it is believed that it can be resolved locally.” ERIN 
BAINES, JUSTICE & RECONCILIATION PROJECT, THE COOLING OF HEARTS: COMMUNITY TRUTH-
TELLING IN ACHOLI-LAND 11 (2007), available at http://www.justiceandreconciliation.com/#/ 
publications/4516360892. 
39. LIU INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES ET AL., ROCO WAT I ACOLI: RESTORING RELATIONSHIPS 
IN ACHOLI-LAND: TRADITIONAL APPROACHES TO JUSTICE AND REINTEGRATION 14 (2005), 
available at http://www.ligi.ubc.ca/sites/liu/files/Publications/JRP/15Sept2005_Roco_Wat_I_ 
Acoli.pdf. 
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concentration of both victims and perpetrators among the Acholi popu-
lation, much attention has focused on a particular ritual known as mato 
oput40 (literally, “drinking of the bitter root”), which the Acholi have 
traditionally used to address both intentional and accidental killings,41 
and which exemplifies the aforementioned values. Although the particu-
lar elements of the mato oput may differ from case to case, the defining 
feature of this tradition is that it restores social harmony after a homi-
cide through confessions, negotiated compensation, and, ultimately, re-
conciliation between the offender and the victim’s kin.42 The process 
culminates in a ritual whose individualized elements—typically includ-
ing the beating of a stick, ritual slaughter, and the eating and drinking of 
various substances (including the “bitter root” for which the ceremony 
is named)—all play a symbolic role in furthering the goals of truth-
seeking and reconciliation. Alongside the Amnesty Act, these and other 
cleansing rituals have played an important role to date in the reintegra-
tion of former LRA members into their communities.43 
Consistent with these practices of traditional justice, Ugandan author-
ities have repeatedly suggested that a comprehensive peace agreement 
would permit the specific LRA leaders sought by the ICC to undergo 
alternative justice procedures of some form or another without need for 
incarceration.44 In early 2007, for example, the government’s lead nego-
tiator maintained that the LRA leaders would be required to confess to 
their crimes, apologize, and become subject to certain sanctions, such as 
payment of reparations and restrictions on their freedom of movement.45 
Many accounts indicate that this solution enjoyed broad support among 
Ugandans, and especially the Acholi. Indeed, the Ugandan government 
largely justified its position by claiming that this is the course that the 
Acholi desire.46 While visiting northern Uganda in September 2006, UN 
Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs Jan Egeland reported 
that “the predominant feeling among all the stakeholders in the peace 
process is that the ICC warrant of arrest should be dropped against the 
LRA leaders so that a peaceful conclusion to the talks can be 
reached.”47 He elaborated that “[t]here is no doubt that 98 percent of the 
IDPs [internally displaced persons] believe that peace is the priority and 
                                                          
40. BAINES, supra note 38, at 9. 
41. LIU INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES ET AL., supra note 39, at 54, 57. 
42. Id. at 54–66. 
43. See id.; see also Afako, supra note 37, at 67. 
44. See supra note 36 and accompanying text. 
45. Allio et al., supra note 36. 
46. Id. 
47. Grace Matsiko, Frank Nyakairu & Paul Harera, Kony Charges a Stumbling Block, Says 
UN Chief, DAILY MONITOR (Kampala), Sept. 13, 2006. 
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punishment for crimes committed is not.”48 Even Human Rights Watch, 
a leading advocate for conventional criminal trials of those most respon-
sible for LRA atrocities, has acknowledged that only a “distinct vocal 
minority” of Ugandan displaced persons shares its views.49 Other re-
ports have painted a more complex picture, emphasizing a diversity of 
viewpoints and reasoning among victims while nevertheless confirming 
pervasive victim sentiment opposing the ICC warrants.50 
What, then, has divided the parties? The issue appears to be largely 
one of timing and assurances. The Ugandan authorities publicly pledged 
that they would go to the ICC to seek withdrawal of charges, but only 
after the LRA leaders surrendered and underwent the mato oput cere-
mony.51 The LRA, by contrast, repeatedly demanded the withdrawal of 
the charges as a pre-condition to a final agreement. Of course, such a 
withdrawal was not something the Ugandan government could accom-
plish without the cooperation of the ICC. As the New York Times noted 
in reference to the stalled negotiations in 2006, it was “an impasse that 
possibly only the international court [could] break.”52 
Since that time, the process has followed a familiar pattern. Months 
of negotiations have yielded apparent breakthroughs, only to have hopes 
dashed by Kony’s last-minute refusals to emerge and sign agreements. 
Each round also has revealed repeated attempts to devise acceptable al-
ternatives to ICC jurisdiction. After returning to the negotiating table, 
the Ugandan government and the LRA signed a June 2007 Agreement 
on Accountability and Reconciliation (Agreement) dealing specifically 
with the question of accountability for serious crimes.53 Although the 
                                                          
48. There is hope for peace in the north – Egeland, AFROL NEWS/IRIN, Nov. 15, 2006, 
http://www.afrol.com/articles/22662. 
49. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, BENCHMARKS FOR ASSESSING POSSIBLE NATIONAL 
ALTERNATIVES TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT CASES AGAINST LRA LEADERS (2007), 
reprinted in BENCHMARKS FOR JUSTICE FOR SERIOUS CRIMES IN NORTHERN UGANDA 1, 4 
(2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/legacy/pub/2008/ij/uganda_memos_cover.pdf. 
50. One 2007 study of Ugandan victim sentiment found that “[s]entiments of anger and 
vengefulness and a desire for prosecution abound in many communities, though there are still 
some perceived pragmatic advantages to amnesty, particularly to facilitate the return home of 
low-level LRA perpetrators (including former abductees), whom many respondents consider 
‘children of the community.’” MAKING PEACE OUR OWN, supra note 23, at ii. The same report 
confirms the existence of an “overwhelming desire for reconciliation,” albeit with views differing 
on how best to accomplish reconciliation. Id. 
51. Allio at al., supra note 36. 
52. Gettleman, supra note 5, at A8. 
53. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Agreement on Accountability and Re-
conciliation Between the Government of the Republic of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Ar-
my/Movement (Nov. 18, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc589232.pdf 
[hereinafter Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation]; see also UGANDA: LRA Talks 
Reach Agreement on Accountability, IRIN, June 30, 2007, http://irinnews.org/Report.aspx? 
ReportId=73010. 
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document’s preamble highlights a specific commitment to “the require-
ments of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (ICC) 
and in particular the principle of complementarity,” the Agreement rais-
es more questions than it answers about the handling of LRA crimes.54 
Emphasizing throughout the dual goals of “accountability” and “recon-
ciliation,” the Agreement endorses a combination of methods to achieve 
them. On the one hand, the Agreement specifies that “[t]raditional jus-
tice mechanisms [including mato oput as well as others] . . . shall be 
promoted, with necessary modifications, as a central part of the frame-
work for accountability and reconciliation.”55 On the other hand, it also 
provides that “[f]ormal criminal and civil justice measures shall be ap-
plied to any individual who is alleged to have committed serious crimes 
or human rights violations in the course of the conflict,”56 and that those 
“alleged to bear particular responsibility for the most serious crimes, es-
pecially crimes amounting to international crimes” are subject to the ju-
risdiction of “formal courts provided for under the Constitution.”57 
While these provisions would seem to abandon the idea of using ma-
to oput or some other form of traditional justice to try Kony and other 
suspects targeted by the ICC, the Agreement on Accountability and Re-
conciliation does not equate the use of formal courts with the imposition 
of typical criminal penalties. Instead it provides that “[l]egislation shall 
introduce a regime of alternative penalties and sanctions which shall ap-
ply, and replace existing penalties, with respect to serious crimes and 
human rights violations committed by non-state actors in the course of 
the conflict.”58 The Agreement offers no detail on what the content of 
these alternative penalties shall provide except that they shall, “as rele-
vant, reflect the gravity of the crimes or violations; promote reconcilia-
tion between individuals and within communities; promote the rehabili-
tation of offenders; take into account an individual’s admissions or other 
cooperation with proceedings; and, require perpetrators to make repara-
tions to victims.”59 Since the time of the Agreement, Ugandan President 
Yoweri Museveni has continued to endorse the idea of traditional justice 
or amnesty for Kony, thereby raising further questions as to whether the 
Agreement is intended as a departure from these measures.60 
                                                          
54. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, supra note 53, pmbl. 
55. Id. cl. 3.1. 
56. Id. cl. 4.1. This provision suggests a further distinction between LRA and government 
suspects by providing that “state actors shall be subjected to existing criminal justice processes 
and not to special justice processes under this Agreement.” Id. 
57. Id. cl. 6.1. 
58. Id. cl. 6.3. 
59. Id. cl. 6.4. 
60. See, e.g., Ugandan Rebel Leader Still Eligible for Amnesty: Museveni, AGENCE FR.-
PRESSE, Mar. 9, 2009, available at 3/9/09 AGFRP 18:10:00 (Westlaw). 
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In February 2008, the parties executed a further annex to the June 
29th agreement specifying, among other provisions, that trials of indi-
viduals accused of serious crimes shall be handled by a newly created 
special division of the High Court of Uganda.61 The annex also reaf-
firms the commitment to traditional justice, including mato oput, and 
provides for the establishment of a government body charged with truth-
seeking and preservation of historical memory, among other tasks.62 
Days later, the parties announced a “permanent cease-fire” agreement, 
hailed by one media source as “a major step toward a final peace set-
tlement to their two-decade war.”63 In April, however, Kony once again 
refused to appear for a scheduled signing ceremony and reverted to his 
previous refusal to sign a final peace agreement until the ICC had 
quashed the outstanding warrants.64 Another scheduled signing came 
and went that November.65 In the meantime, news reports reflected in-
creasing LRA abductions of young children.66 
With the prospects of a negotiated peace appearing increasingly re-
mote, Uganda reverted to military efforts in late 2008, launching a joint 
operation with DR Congo and Sudan aimed at encircling and defeating 
the LRA in the area of the Congo-Uganda border.67 Although the opera-
tion benefited from U.S. military assistance, initial reports indicated a 
botched operation that backfired after Kony and the bulk of his forces 
escaped intact and promptly proceeded to take their revenge on Congo-
lese villagers.68 By early February the rampage had reportedly claimed 
the lives of almost one thousand civilians, with others abducted or left 
mutilated.69 
Notwithstanding these initial setbacks, the renewed military pressure 
appeared for a time to be taking its toll on the LRA. First, reports 
emerged that two of the three living suspects accused by the ICC—LRA 
                                                          
61. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Annexure to the Agreement on Accoun-
tability and Reconciliation, cl. 7 (June 29, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/ 
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62. Id. cls. 3, 19–21. 
63. Uganda and Rebels Sign Cease-Fire, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 24, 2008, at A4. 
64. Jeffrey Gettelman & Alexis Okeowo, Warlord’s Absence Derails Another Peace Effort in 
Uganda, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 12, 2008, at A9. 
65. Jeffrey Gettleman & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Aided a Failed Plan to Rout Ugandan Rebels, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 6, 2009, at A1. 
66. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Uganda: LRA Atrocities Demand Action (May 
19, 2008), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2008/05/19/uganda-lra-regional-atrocities-
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67. Gettleman & Schmitt, supra note 65, at A1, A7. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. at A1; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE CHRISTMAS MASSACRES: LRA 
ATTACKS ON CIVILIANS IN NORTHERN CONGO (2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/sites/ 
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commanders Dominic Ongwen and Okot Odhiambo—had defected 
from the rebels and were willing to surrender in exchange for amnesty 
and assurances that they would not be sent to the ICC.70 Both men are 
charged with directing LRA atrocities, and the Odhiambo warrant sin-
gles him out for particular brutality, noting that he “is described by for-
mer LRA commanders and members as a ‘ruthless killer’, ‘the one who 
killed the most’, and ‘a ‘bitter’ man who will kill anyone.’”71 Next, re-
ports emerged that Kony was surrounded in a swamp in DR Congo with 
a reduced force of only 250 fighters and little hope of escape.72 In 
March, however, Uganda withdrew its troops from DR Congo, raising 
fears that the operation had failed and that Kony might return to Uganda 
to commit additional crimes.73 
As this Article goes to press, the final contours of peace and justice in 
Uganda remain unclear. The possibility of the LRA’s military defeat 
might render irrelevant any offers made in earlier negotiations, but pro-
posals to employ alternative justice mechanisms have in fact continued. 
At a February 2009 press conference, Museveni reportedly promised 
amnesty to Ongwen and Odhiambo and emphasized that Kony would 
also have received amnesty had he signed the Juba peace agreements 
the previous April.74 Museveni has also recently reemphasized that 
“Kony still has a chance to take advantage of the amnesty if he stops 
fighting.”75 At the same time, Uganda has yet to clarify the nature of the 
court system promised under the 2008 annex. Thus, not only do the ma-
jor LRA suspects remain at large, but it remains unclear what, if any, 
punitive measures will be applied in the event the suspects are appre-
hended.76 Given the LRA’s past behavior, it is reasonable to suppose 
that Kony will not surrender absent a commitment on Uganda’s part to 
minimal, even token, punishment.77 Moreover, the ICC arrest warrants 
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remain in effect with no word as to whether, and under what conditions, 
the ICC will defer to domestic justice initiatives. 
II. UGANDA AND THE ROME STATUTE 
As a legal matter, the LRA’s concerns about the enforceability of a 
final peace deal that sidelines the ICC are well-founded. Although it 
was Uganda itself that referred the LRA’s abuses to the Court, the 
Rome Statute lacks any provision contemplating the withdrawal of re-
ferrals submitted by States Parties.78 And because Uganda is a party to 
the Rome Statute, the ICC prosecutor did not even require Uganda’s au-
thorization to bring charges against the LRA suspects.79 The matter, 
then, is not really in Uganda’s hands at all, as the arrest warrants for 
Kony and his underlings cannot be withdrawn unless the ICC itself 
agrees to do so. 
Moreover, influential voices within the international human rights 
community have urged the ICC to reject domestic justice alternatives, at 
least to the extent that they do not offer serious punishments for serious 
international crimes.80 These voices include former prosecutors of the 
ICC’s predecessor international criminal tribunals.81 For instance, Ri-
chard Goldstone, former chief prosecutor for the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tri-
bunal for Rwanda, objected that the ICC is not “a convenient hot water 
tap that can be turned on or off” and has condemned Ugandan President 
Museveni for “acting in contravention of international law. . . . His gov-
ernment signed the . . . Rome Statute, and offers of amnesty violate the 
letter of the law.”82 
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What, if anything, does the Rome Statute itself say about these mat-
ters? Does it provide any guidance as to what impact a final Ugandan 
peace deal might have on the outstanding warrants? Contrary to Gold-
stone’s confident invocation of the “letter of the law,” the ICC’s consti-
tutive treaty is surprisingly silent on this matter, raising difficult ques-
tions about how exactly the ICC’s work should relate to national efforts. 
Substantial debate has focused on two provisions of the Rome Statute to 
which I turn here, both of which are central to the ICC’s eventual re-
sponse to a Ugandan peace proposal: Article 17, with its framework for 
mandatory deference to state investigations and prosecutions, and Ar-
ticle 53, which allows that the prosecutor may otherwise decline to in-
vestigate or prosecute based on the “interests of justice.” 
I am, of course, not the first to identify the ambiguities raised by 
these articles. In highlighting these provisions, however, my aim is not 
merely to expose interpretational complexities, but instead to call atten-
tion to the ways in which the application of these provisions to situa-
tions like that in Uganda complicates the very rationales traditionally 
invoked to justify the ICC’s existence. 
A. Article 17: Complementarity 
It is often said that the ICC is a court of last resort, designed to inter-
vene only when other avenues of justice have failed.83 The Rome Sta-
tute’s preamble emphasizes this design when it proclaims that “the In-
ternational Criminal Court established under this Statute shall be 
complementary to national criminal jurisdictions.”84 Article 17 of the 
Statute gives effect to this aspiration by providing that cases of geno-
cide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes otherwise within the 
Court’s jurisdiction may be inadmissible if subject to national investiga-
tion or prosecution. 
The question of how ICC trials intersect with state proceedings is 
plainly an important one. From one vantage point, complementarity de-
fines the scope of the Court’s own work. Yet perhaps even more impor-
tant is the perspective of the state seeking deference from the ICC. Al-
though the Rome Statute itself does not speak in these terms, it is 
natural to conceive of complementarity as defining a state’s obligations. 
At his swearing-in ceremony, current ICC Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo 
emphasized that “[a]s a consequence of complementarity, the number of 
cases that reach the Court should not be a measure [of] its efficiency. 
On the contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a conse-
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2009] COMPLEMENTARITY IN CRISIS 123 
quence of the regular functioning of national institutions, would be a 
major success.”85 The reverse implication, of course, is that the prosecu-
tion of a matter by the ICC signals that something has gone wrong at the 
national level or that efforts by domestic authorities have proven inade-
quate. In other words, the ICC’s structure ensures that in many cases the 
state itself is on trial in some substantial sense. For a state that now, like 
Uganda, seeks to avoid the intervention of the ICC, it is critically impor-
tant to know which responses to past crimes will command the defe-
rence of the ICC. 
1. Text 
The requirements of Article 17 are superficially straightforward and 
provide separately for national proceedings at the investigation, prose-
cution, and post-judgment phases. First, a case “being investigated or 
prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it” is inadmissible 
“unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the inves-
tigation or prosecution.”86 Similarly, if a state has investigated a case 
and “has decided not to prosecute the person concerned,”87 the result 
must stand “unless the decision resulted from the unwillingness or ina-
bility of the State genuinely to prosecute.”88 Finally, where a “person 
concerned has already been tried for conduct which is the subject of [a] 
complaint,” the case is inadmissible unless the proceedings in the other 
court “[w]ere for the purpose of shielding the person concerned from 
criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court” or 
“[o]therwise were not conducted independently or impartially in accor-
dance with the norms of due process recognized by international 
law and were conducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was 
inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”89 
There is also an important procedural dimension to these provisions. 
In the event that the Court pursues an investigation or case, both the ac-
cused and any state with jurisdiction are entitled to contest jurisdiction 
and admissibility before a Pre-Trial Chamber, in which case comple-
mentarity becomes a judicially-applied principle.90 The presiding Pre-
Trial Chamber may also raise the question of admissibility on its own 
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motion, as it has done recently with respect to the Uganda warrants.91 
But the Rome Statute does not provide for judicial review of the prose-
cutor's initial decision to defer to state investigations or prosecutions un-
less a state party or the Security Council referred the situation to the 
Court, and the party who made the referral seeks further review.92 Thus, 
in at least some instances complementarity appears to become a matter 
of pure prosecutorial discretion. Less clear is the situation, potentially at 
issue in Uganda, in which the prosecutor seeks to withdraw existing 
charges based on a state’s compliance with Article 17. The statute al-
lows that “[t]he Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision 
whether to initiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or 
information,”93 but elsewhere it provides that arrest warrants, once is-
sued, “shall remain in effect until otherwise ordered by the Court.”94 
Moreover, the statute requires judicial permission for the prosecutor to 
amend the charges at the pre-trial stage,95 or withdraw the charges after 
trial has begun.96 The deference, if any, owed to prosecutorial discretion 
in these circumstances is not specified. 
2. Problems 
The text of Article 17 has given rise to various interpretive questions 
that have commanded substantial scholarly attention, including book-
length treatments.97 Rather than attempt a comprehensive account of 
every thorny question that might arise, I will focus here on two slippery 
slopes that complicate the application of the complementarity standard 
to a situation like the one in Uganda. The first has to do with basic defi-
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nitions, such as what constitutes a trial or an investigation. The second 
concerns tensions between the collective and individual nature of the 
determination. In both cases, the difficulty is essentially the same: ap-
plication of the complementarity principle inevitably enmeshes the 
Court into contested questions about the purposes of international crim-
inal justice for which there is no easy answer and which may, in fact, be 
unsolvable. 
a. “Genuine” Investigations and Prosecutions 
Much of what makes Uganda such a difficult test case for the appli-
cation of Article 17 is the range of procedural models potentially avail-
able to address LRA atrocities. At one end of the spectrum is the Am-
nesty Act, which shields perpetrators from punishment so long as they 
renounce the LRA.98 At the other end is the ICC itself, which makes 
available an actual court to try Kony and his fellow accused and also 
provides a procedural model rooted in conventional forms of criminal 
justice for domestic courts to emulate. In between these poles, and hard-
er to categorize, is the model of Ugandan traditional justice exemplified 
by the mato oput ceremony.99 By one measure, mato oput could be said 
to possess the bare trappings of a criminal trial. The envisioned ceremo-
ny includes an individualized admission of guilt followed by sanctions. 
But the token nature of the sanction, the lack of procedural rigor, and 
the emphasis on forgiveness and reconciliation reveal something very 
different from the kind of criminal justice typically associated with se-
rious violent crimes, even under Uganda’s own justice system.100 Final-
ly, there is Uganda’s offer to employ “[f]ormal criminal and civil justice 
measures” through a special division of the formal court system.101 Here 
we have the specter of a proceeding whose external formalities may be 
those of a conventional trial but is subject to “a [yet-to-be-determined] 
regime of alternative penalties and sanctions,”102 whose goals explicitly 
should include “reconciliation between individuals and within commun-
ities.”103 
                                                          
98. Amnesty Act, 2000 ch. 294 § 3 (2000) (Uganda), available at http://www.ulii.org/ug/ 
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99. See LIU INST. FOR GLOBAL ISSUES ET AL., supra note 39, at 4, 14; Afako, supra note 37 
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100. See Human Rights Watch, Uganda: The June 29 Agreement on Accountability and Re-
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101. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, supra note 53, cl. 4.1. 
102. Id. cl. 6.3. 
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ernment suspects. Id. cl. 4.1 (“[S]tate actors shall be subjected to existing criminal justice 
processes and not to special justice processes under this Agreement.”). 
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Applying Article 17 to these procedures presents obvious definitional 
problems. The statute does not explain what exactly it means for a state 
to “prosecute” a case. It also contemplates deference where a “case is 
being [or has been] investigated or prosecuted.”104 Therefore, as some 
commentators have observed, Article 17 does not necessarily even re-
quire a prosecution at all. This phrasing has given rise to speculation 
that an institution, such as a truth commission, that investigates atroci-
ties for purposes of truth-telling rather than punishment might count as 
an “investigation” for purposes of the Rome Statute.105 
Whatever one’s position on this matter, one point beyond dispute is 
that the requirement of investigation or prosecution is not a purely for-
mal or mechanical demand. The Statute requires that these be genuinely 
carried out,106 and it refuses deference to procedures that “were con-
ducted in a manner which, in the circumstances, was inconsistent with 
an intent to bring the person concerned to justice.”107 In providing for 
this qualification, the drafters were most directly concerned with the 
prospect of states using sham proceedings—which might outwardly 
look much like genuine ones—to evade justice.108 The situation in 
Uganda is obviously more complicated, however, because the argument 
for alternative justice mechanisms is rooted not in sympathy for the 
LRA or a desire to deny the culpability of Kony and others, but instead 
in a desire to promote peace and reconciliation alongside accountability. 
Determining whether nonconventional proceedings motivated by these 
goals are “genuine” prosecutions or investigations necessarily invites 
inquiry into contested questions regarding the purpose of both the crim-
inal law and the ICC itself. 
To perceive the difficulty here, it helps to begin with a restrictive in-
terpretation of Article 17. With regard to the definition of what it means 
to genuinely prosecute, one might interpret the Statute to require pro-
ceedings that, subject to basic requirements of due process and humane 
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2009] COMPLEMENTARITY IN CRISIS 127 
punishment,109 aim to ensure that the guilty receive sentences commen-
surate with their culpability irrespective of other extrinsic factors.110 A 
genuine investigation, according to this desert-based framework, would 
similarly focus on ensuring that the guilty receive their just deserts: a 
state might decline to pursue a prosecution if a thorough good faith in-
vestigation failed to turn up sufficient evidence to establish guilt, but the 
state would not be allowed to abandon an investigation or prosecution 
for reasons wholly unrelated to individual culpability, such as when the 
accused happens to be a member of the military or a government offi-
cial. Similar principles would apply at the trial and sentencing stages, 
and not only to the prosecutors’ conduct, but also to the judges and the 
adequacy of the rules and procedures governing the trial. 
Of course, even within these relatively restrictive parameters, there is 
still potential for much complexity in the application of Article 17 re-
quirements to a particular prosecution or investigation. In the first place, 
there is no definitive answer as to what the deserved punishment is for a 
particular offense. The trying court, however, can mitigate this problem 
by taking guidance from the general sentencing practices of internation-
al criminal tribunals or other courts within the state asserting jurisdic-
tion.111 There will also be questions regarding the degree of deference 
owed by the ICC to the domestic justice system’s judgments about what 
a desert-based standard requires, from the initial questions of whether to 
prosecute and which crimes to charge, to the determination of the ap-
propriate sentence. It may well be that a generous margin of latitude is 
required.112 But even accounting for these caveats, it would not be hard 
to reject justice schemes that provide mass murderers with formal am-
nesty or limit their punishment to monetary compensation. Therefore, 
even affording Uganda’s justice system a wide margin of latitude, the 
ICC would have little difficulty rejecting Uganda’s efforts as inconsis-
tent with a desert-based reading of the Rome Statute. 
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111. For a general discussion of the problems of desert-based sentencing, see Paul H. Robin-
son, Competing Conceptions of Modern Desert: Vengeful, Deontological, and Empirical, 67 
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The more difficult question, however, is whether Article 17 should in 
fact be read to force states into the strict proportionality box that I have 
imagined. Indeed, the model I have just outlined does not even comport 
with the standard practices of criminal justice systems that routinely 
employ devices such as prosecutorial discretion and plea bargaining to 
abandon cases or reduce sentences based on systemic considerations un-
related to the desert of the individual accused.113 The considerations are 
even more complex in the context of international criminal law, where 
prosecutions frequently focus on places like Uganda where mass atroci-
ties have fundamentally disrupted the social order and given rise to 
unique dilemmas. As I have observed elsewhere, the standard rationales 
invoked to establish the ICC and its predecessor international criminal 
tribunals have focused not simply on the goal of giving particular de-
fendants their deserved punishments, but also on the broader aspiration 
that international trials will facilitate society-wide transformation by 
breaking cycles of violence, delegitimizing criminal regimes, and foster-
ing peaceful societies rooted in the rule of law.114 
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SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 51, 53–54 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen eds., 2000) 
(“The denial of atrocity is closely linked to the committing of atrocity. . . . After a war, distorted 
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In theory, these special background justifications for international 
criminal tribunals might not say much about the mechanics of prosecu-
tion at either the international or domestic level. Historically, one of the 
roles of international criminal tribunals has been—in Justice Robert H. 
Jackson’s famous words at Nuremberg—to “stay the hand of ven-
geance” by affording the worst war criminals a fair criminal trial that 
embodies the ideals of liberal society.115 But for purposes of applying 
Article 17 to situation like Uganda, much of the difficulty rests on the 
fact that advocates of alternative justice mechanisms invoke these very 
same forward-looking, transformational goals in justifying limits on 
states’ obligations to pursue conventional criminal justice. 
These aspirations most famously took center stage when South Africa 
dismantled its apartheid regime and created a Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission (TRC) to grant individualized amnesties in exchange for 
full, public confessions of political crimes.116 In its final report, the TRC 
presented various rationales for why its method better realized values 
such as justice, peace, and accountability than could have been achieved 
by insisting on conventional criminal prosecutions.117 It argued that 
South Africa could not have made a peaceful transition to a more just 
society without offering amnesties to the outgoing regime; that insis-
tence on individual prosecution would inevitably have run up against 
the realities of resource constraints, lost or inaccessible evidence, and 
uncooperative witnesses;118 and that the TRC facilitated a qualitatively 
distinct form of restorative justice based on reconciliation and forgive-
ness that is independently desirable and not possible through regular tri-
als.119 Thus, despite some possible sacrifice in justice, the argument is 
that the TRC process as a whole facilitated a greater amount of aggre-
gate justice or equivalent moral goods than would otherwise have been 
possible. 
The same set of considerations applies even in situations where states 
do choose some form of prosecution rather than amnesty. Indeed, there 
exists not a binary choice between prosecution and non-prosecution, but 
rather a continuum of strategies, including selective prosecutions and 
alternative justice mechanisms that offer reduced sanctions and may not 
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look like conventional criminal trials. In Rwanda, for example, the gov-
ernment has pursued the death penalty against many perpetrators of the 
1994 genocide, but faced with the sheer enormity of participation in that 
crime, also has sent the vast majority of suspects (numbering in the tens 
of thousands) to informal village proceedings known as gacaca trials at 
which perpetrators are offered greatly reduced sentences in exchange 
for their confessions.120 Even some leaders of the genocide are guaran-
teed as little as three and a half years prison time coupled with commu-
nity service in exchange for their confessions.121 In most cases, moreo-
ver, the prison time has already been served in pre-trial detention. 
Although the Rwandan government has justified this approach partly 
based on resource constraints, it has also appealed to the value of recon-
ciliation, hardly an irrelevant concept in a state where the genocide’s 
primary victims, the Tutsi, remain a minority.122 
The dilemma, therefore, is that alternative justice schemes like the 
South African TRC and Rwandan gacaca trials fall somewhere on a 
continuum of justice. They do not offer full trials or full punishment in 
the conventional sense. But neither do they present the case of a state 
endorsing or turning its back on past crimes. To the extent that such 
schemes might be consistent with the Rome Statute, it is difficult to 
draw the line between sufficient and insufficient proceedings for the 
purposes of Article 17. Once the broader goals of reconciliation and po-
litical transition enter into the equation, any number of compromises to 
a fully desert-based scheme might be justified. Does a state comply with 
the Rome Statute’s genuine prosecution requirement when it binds itself 
under a legislative bargaining scheme to impose sentences that are, for 
instance, only ten percent of what is considered deserved according to 
some benchmark such as the state’s normal criminal justice practices? 
How about punishments that are even more lenient, entailing only 
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community service, payment of compensation, or perhaps some form of 
public shaming? All of these questions are vital to the ICC’s assessment 
of Uganda’s domestic justice initiatives, whether they take the form of 
traditional village justice or rely on formal courts to mete out reduced or 
minimal sanctions for the guilty. 
b. Individual Justice Versus Collective Justice 
These observations point to the second slippery slope: the relation-
ship between individual and collective justice under the Rome Statute. 
The text of Article 17 focuses on the individual accused. It asks whether 
a state has investigated “the case” at hand and whether it has prosecuted 
“the person” at issue.123 Yet, one of the strongest justifications for non-
traditional justice schemes is that they may actually provide more jus-
tice for societies recovering from mass atrocities than an atomistic focus 
that may more severely punish a select group of individuals while leav-
ing the broader mass of wrongdoers at large. Had the South African re-
gime insisted on full trials for every perpetrator, it might have failed to 
achieve the necessary political transition, or it might have found the ef-
fort so frustrating and costly that it could only pursue a few cases.124 
Rwanda’s over-burdened justice system had held tens of thousands of 
genocide suspects in pre-trial detention for a decade before the gacaca 
trials began.125 Had the government insisted on comprehensive criminal 
trials as the exclusive mechanism for confronting these crimes, it simply 
could not have processed a great number of these cases without stret-
ching the process out for decades longer.126 Because they cast a broader 
net, nonconventional responses may collectively better serve the goals 
of punishment even where they fail to ensure full accountability for in-
dividual offenders. To what extent does the Rome Statute authorize this 
more encompassing analysis? 
Opinions on these questions have varied. In a 1998 speech in South 
Africa, then-UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan adopted a position high-
ly favorable to a TRC-style process, condemning as a “travesty” the ar-
gument that “an exemplary process of national reconciliation might be 
torpedoed, since the Statute empowers the Court to intervene in cases 
where a State is ‘unwilling or unable’ to exercise its national jurisdic-
tion.”127 He continued: 
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The purpose of that clause in the Statute is to ensure that mass 
murderers and other arch-criminals cannot shelter behind a State 
run by themselves or their cronies, or take advantage of a general 
breakdown of law and order. No one should imagine that it 
would apply to a case like South Africa’s, where the regime and 
the conflict which caused the crimes have come to an end, and 
the victims have inherited power.128 
A group of experts who convened to advise the ICC Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP) on complementarity took a less confident view. Opin-
ing that alternatives to prosecution “should not be summarily dis-
missed,” they simultaneously expressed skepticism that the highest-
level perpetrators should benefit from such processes, and they further 
identified a set of criteria for assessing situations on a case-by-case ba-
sis.129 The group further advised that “it would be preferable for the 
OTP to avoid promulgating too precise a position on the issue, until 
some experience is acquired in actual situations,” but simultaneously 
cautioned that “a proactive stance will however be necessary if, for ex-
ample, the OTP is consulted by a state party developing an alternative 
justice mechanism.”130 
B. Article 53: Interests of Justice 
Complementarity is not the only basis upon which the Rome Statute 
might favor deference to unconventional domestic processes. Article 53 
further invokes the “interests of justice” as a separate and independent 
basis to block the ICC’s investigation or prosecution of a case. It pro-
vides that the prosecutor may decline to investigate an otherwise ad-
missible case when, “[t]aking into account the gravity of the crime and 
the interests of victims, there are nonetheless substantial reasons to be-
lieve that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice.”131 
Similarly, the prosecutor may determine after investigation that “[a] 
prosecution is not in the interests of justice, taking into account all the 
circumstances, including the gravity of the crime, the interests of vic-
tims and the age or infirmity of the alleged perpetrator, and his or her 
role in the alleged crime.”132 
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Although the language of Article 53 is even more open-ended than 
the complementarity provisions of Article 17, the Rome Statute subjects 
its invocation to greater judicial review. In the event that the prosecutor 
elects not to proceed with a case solely due to the “interests of justice,” 
the decision must be reported to the Pre-Trial Chamber for review.133 
By contrast (and again unlike complementarity), there is no judicial 
check on this ground when the prosecutor does decide to proceed with a 
case. Therefore, complementarity provides the more secure method of 
avoiding judicial oversight when the prosecutor decides not to pursue a 
case and of securing judicial oversight when the prosecutor does decide 
to move forward. 
To appreciate the significance of this provision, one must remember 
that it only has effect when the prosecutor determines the case is other-
wise admissible: there must first be a suspect accused of genocide, 
crimes against humanity, or war crimes plus a state that has failed “ge-
nuinely to investigate or prosecute” the offense.134 Pursuant to an addi-
tional statutory requirement, the crime must also be “of sufficient gravi-
ty to justify further action by the Court.”135 Yet even when all these 
factors are present, the prosecutor may still decline to move forward on 
the ground that the interests of justice so dictate. As the ICC prosecutor 
has acknowledged, the “interests of justice” recognized by Article 51 
are necessarily “broader than criminal justice in a narrow sense.”136 
Although the Rome Statute itself leaves wide open what circums-
tances might trigger the interests of justice, it was reportedly a debate 
over South Africa’s TRC that directly inspired the drafters to include 
this language.137 Despite “widespread sympathy” for South Africa’s ex-
perience, delegates to the treaty’s drafting conference also raised con-
cerns about other “disgraceful” amnesties like the one that the late Chi-
lean President Augusto Pinochet had accorded himself.138 Unable to 
agree on a specific legal test, the delegates settled on language that 
opened the door to such processes but provided no guidance as to the 
circumstances under which alternatives to prosecution might be ac-
cepted. In the words of the conference chair and current ICC president 
Philippe Kirsch, the “interests of justice” language reflects a decision to 
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settle for “creative ambiguity,”139 leaving the elaboration of more con-
crete standards regarding when to permit alternatives to prosecution to 
case-by-case evolution. 
III. LEGITIMACY AND PROSECUTORIAL POLICY 
The mere fact that the Rome Statute raises interpretive difficulties is 
hardly surprising. However, the problems posed by the Uganda peace 
process point to a deeper instability in the very structure of the Interna-
tional Criminal Court. The ICC, after all, is an institution structured on a 
relationship between national justice and international authority. Yet it 
is this very relationship that the Rome Statute leaves fundamentally un-
defined, ultimately calling into question the very justifications invoked 
to create the ICC in the first place. Advocates for the Court decried the 
political dependence of ad hoc predecessor tribunals whose limited 
mandates reflected the discrete priorities of particular political forces 
like the victors of World War II or the states comprising the UN Securi-
ty Council.140 By creating a permanent tribunal whose prosecutor pos-
sesses substantial independent authority to pursue cases free from any 
political trigger, the drafters of the Rome Statute sought to depoliticize 
international justice and move “a further step down the road from par-
tiality to impartiality.”141 In other words, the ICC was founded partly on 
the idea that international criminal justice was a legal matter whose im-
plementation must be trusted to competent legal professionals applying 
neutral legal rules, rather than to political actors. This conception of the 
ICC has also permeated the public rhetoric of the Court’s current offi-
cials. In a recent speech marking the Court’s ten-year anniversary, Mo-
reno-Ocampo emphasized that “as the Prosecutor, my duty is to apply 
the law without political considerations. I cannot adjust to political con-
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siderations.”142 The Court’s President Kirsch has similarly urged that 
“[o]nce a process as [sic] been triggered, then the court has to function 
as a court, not as a political body . . . .”143 
This argument makes sense to the extent that broad international 
agreement exists regarding both the obligations of states in response to 
international crimes and the appropriate conditions for international in-
tervention. But since those questions remain fundamentally unresolved, 
the authority of the ICC’s prosecutors and judges in many ways be-
comes more like that of an administrative agency given a broad statuto-
ry mandate to pursue independent regulation and policymaking. The 
ICC thereby becomes, in a sense, a regulatory agency whose responsi-
bilities include the assessment of transitional justice policies undertaken 
by states where crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction have occurred. 
Although reframing the ICC’s authority in this way might clarify 
matters, it also raises difficult questions about the Court’s underlying 
legitimacy. Standard justifications for administrative delegations have 
focused on the special expertise of administrators and the existence of 
democratic legitimacy through various forms of oversight by both 
elected officials and the public itself. The ICC, by contrast, does not fit 
easily within either framework. Are the judges and prosecutors of the 
ICC the appropriate actors to make broad-based policy judgments about 
what form of transitional justice is best for Uganda? If so, the reasons 
are not obvious, and there is no evidence that the drafters of the Rome 
Statute conceived of the ICC in this way. An inquiry into democratic le-
gitimacy does not fare much better.144 The 110 states that have ratified 
the Rome Statute vote collectively on a one-state-one-vote basis for ap-
pointment and removal of the ICC’s prosecutor and judges.145 The 
ICC’s officials operate, in other words, on an international level that is 
far removed from the democratic politics of any particular state, much 
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less the politics of the states most directly affected by the Court’s par-
ticular investigations. Once the Court moves from the realm of substan-
tive criminal law to the open-ended policy dilemmas of transitional jus-
tice, what legitimacy does the ICC have to tell the people of Uganda 
what compromises may or may not be appropriate? 
Despite the centrality of these questions to the ICC’s mission, they 
received relatively little attention in the political debates over the 
Court’s creation. The United States, of course, has famously mounted 
great opposition to the Court’s creation, but its public criticisms have 
predominantly focused on the possibility that a zealous prosecutor 
might use the tribunal for politically motivated prosecutions of U.S. sol-
diers.146 The dilemmas of transitional justice complicate the Court’s 
work regardless of how well-intentioned or “neutral” its officials may 
be. Additionally, the problem is one that reaches well beyond great 
powers, like the United States, to troubled places, like Uganda, which 
have far less influence over world affairs. 
The ICC, of course, is not an institution frozen in place by its found-
ing document. Ultimately, it is the Court itself (and, more indirectly, the 
international community at large) that must give meaning to the Rome 
Statute and supply the ICC with its “law-in-action.” How has the Court 
fared thus far in defining its mandate and safeguarding its legitimacy? 
The Ugandan peace negotiations provide a lens through which to ex-
amine the ICC’s first attempts to come to grips with this question. With 
no suspects arrested, it has been Moreno-Ocampo who has taken the 
lead role thus far, and, accordingly, I focus in this Part on his efforts to 
define the Court’s role with respect to alternative justice in Uganda. 
Looking at the public pronouncements of Moreno-Ocampo’s OTP, the 
ICC’s response to the Ugandan situation reveals two interrelated phe-
nomena: (1) the limitations of ex ante guidelines, favored by some 
commentators as the preferred method of enhancing institutional legiti-
macy; and (2) a tendency to look to external actors for the legitimacy 
that prosecutorial discretion alone may not be able to provide. I consider 
each in turn. 
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A. The Limits of Guidelines 
Some commentators have viewed internal guidelines as a method by 
which the Court’s prosecutor can enhance his own legitimacy by func-
tionally creating the law omitted by the Rome Statute.147 Pre-set guide-
lines promote certainty and predictability among states subject to ICC 
investigations and allow the ICC prosecutor to act according to neutral 
criteria rather than improper motives. Whether or not Moreno-Ocampo 
elects to defer to alternative justice in Uganda, he can protect both his 
perceived legitimacy and that of the Court by ensuring that his decisions 
flow from neutral guidelines established ahead of time without regard to 
the particular context.148 Although advocates of this approach have gen-
erally focused on prosecutorial discretion, a similar framework applies 
to the Court’s judges, who may use case-by-case adjudications to trans-
late the open-ended provisions of the Rome Statute into more concrete 
rules and standards that, though technically applied only to the adjudi-
cated case, may cabin judicial discretion in future cases. In either event, 
this approach foresees that the ICC itself will fill the gaps in its 
mandate. 
1. The Theoretical Challenge of Guidelines 
Although it is hard to deny the theoretical attraction of guidelines, 
there are reasons for skepticism about their ultimate value in negotiating 
situations like the one currently facing Uganda. The mere existence of 
guidelines provides little comfort if their substantive content does not 
serve the goals of the Court or benefit its primary stakeholders, particu-
larly the people of the societies most affected by the ICC’s work. Fur-
ther, the dilemmas of transitional justice faced by states like Uganda 
may simply be too contingent upon case-by-case assessments to lend 
themselves to resolution via standards that are definite enough to serve 
the legitimizing function desired by their advocates. 
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An illustrative example of this tension can be observed in the recent 
work of two scholars who have proposed standards for the ICC to apply 
to alternative justice proposals like those at work in Uganda. In a recent 
article focused on the Uganda arrest warrants, Linda Keller argues that 
the ICC should apply a two-part test to evaluate the adequacy of pro-
posed alternatives to ICC jurisdiction.149 First, alternative justice pro-
posals should pass a threshold test of necessity and legitimacy, which 
Keller believes is met in the Ugandan case because alternative justice is 
necessary to a peaceful resolution of the conflict with the LRA and en-
joys strong support in northern Uganda among the Acholi people whom 
the LRA has primarily victimized.150 Second, alternative justice propos-
als should advance international criminal justice at least to the same ex-
tent that ICC jurisdiction would, as measured by the goals of retribution, 
deterrence, expressivism, and restorative justice.151 Mark Drumbl has 
similarly proposed a policy of “qualified deference” to domestic proce-
dures subject to six interpretative guidelines that he believes should di-
rect the analysis.152 According to this model, alternative justice proce-
dures must be evaluated for (1) good faith; (2) democratic legitimacy; 
(3) the characteristics of the violence the procedures seek to address, as 
well as the current political climate; (4) the avoidance of gratuitous or 
iterated punishment; (5) the effect of the procedures on the universal 
substance (by which Drumbl means that the procedures should condemn 
rather than trivialize great evils); and (6) the preclusion of the infliction 
of great evils on others.153 
My purpose here is not to attempt a detailed substantive evaluation of 
either proposal, but I will mention that there is much in both frame-
works that I find attractive. Consistent with my own observations,154 
Keller and Drumbl both operate from the perspective that, in many situ-
ations, there is more in common between the advocates of alternative 
justice and those of conventional criminal trials than might at first ap-
pear. Their respective approaches also recognize that the prosecution of 
mass atrocities often faces limits and compromises no matter what form 
justice takes. Nonetheless, legal frameworks for transitional justice, 
even appealing ones, do not necessarily reveal the correct institution or 
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institutional actor to apply the framework. Put another way, it is hard to 
see how the adoption of either Keller’s or Drumbl’s approach by the 
ICC’s prosecutor or judges would do much to solve the legitimacy crisis 
that the challenges of transitional justice pose to the ICC’s ostensible 
mission as a legal institution. 
Consider, for example, Keller’s threshold requirement of necessity. 
She argues that Uganda passes this test because it cannot defeat the 
LRA militarily, and therefore, it cannot negotiate peace while insisting 
on full-blown prosecutions.155 That might have seemed true at the time 
of her writing, but with the recent encircling of Kony and his remaining 
forces in DR Congo,156 the situation on the ground began to look very 
different. The tide now appears to have shifted again with Uganda’s 
withdrawal from DR Congo, and may well shift again before my own 
words appear in print, but the fast-changing nature of these events itself 
reveals the difficulty of adopting a test whose application requires litiga-
tors to assess a state’s ability or willingness to achieve a future military 
victory. At the same time, the defeat of the LRA will in no case be cost-
free. Uganda’s previous failures to conclude a peace agreement have al-
ready claimed a terrible price in human life and suffering, both prior to 
and as a result of the recent fighting.157 As this fact reveals, “necessity” 
is not an autonomous, free-standing concept. Logically speaking, alter-
native justice can only be “necessary” to achieve some defined goal. 
How many lives must be saved in order for Ugandan traditional justice 
to become an acceptable alternative to ICC prosecution? Is this a ques-
tion the ICC will ever be able to answer adequately? 
Similar difficulties confront Keller’s remaining criteria. Few would 
oppose an alternative justice mechanism that meets or exceeds the 
ICC’s ability to achieve international criminal justice; the difficulty, 
however, lies in knowing when exactly this is the case, especially when 
multiple theories of criminal justice are thrown into the mix. Some 
commentators, like Drumbl and Keller, may emphasize the benefits of 
truth-seeking, condemnation, reconciliation, and restorative justice as 
justifying alternatives to conventional prosecutions.158 Others, such as 
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, have argued that fore-
going the possibility of more serious punishment for the worst offenders 
amounts to impunity and will be highly detrimental to the goals of jus-
tice and lasting peace.159 Some of these divisions among commentators 
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may turn on empirical questions that effectively collapse into a wide-
ranging necessity analysis that attempts to balance the costs and benefits 
of various scenarios. Drumbl’s framework, for example, would have the 
ICC consider a range of complicated factors including “the effects of 
retrospective accountability on prospective stability,” whether “the so-
ciety [is] transitioning toward democracy or drifting toward a new tota-
litarianism,” and, in the event the society lacks capacity to conduct 
regular trials, “whether the international community could help build 
capacity to effective levels.”160 Even assuming these specific questions 
have answers, the ultimate determination regarding the acceptance of 
alternative justice mechanisms or conventional criminal proceedings 
may well hinge on the comparison of incommensurables. There is, of 
course, no ready way to quantify the amount of “criminal justice” 
achieved under any particular scenario, and minds will differ about the 
various goals at issue. 
In raising these concerns, my aim is not to erect a firm division be-
tween the realms of law and politics, or to suggest that prosecuting or 
judging does not inevitably involve a policy component. But the fact 
remains that it was the allegedly “legal” nature of international justice 
that most powerfully justified the creation of an international criminal 
court subject to the degree of prosecutorial and judicial independence 
enjoyed by the ICC under the Rome Statute.161 To the extent the prose-
cutor is concerned with demonstrating that his actions conform to a 
view that his “duty is to apply the law without political considera-
tions,”162 it is hard to see how adopting either Keller or Drumbl’s open-
ended criteria would actually serve this purpose. Instead, these ap-
proaches seem to invite wide-ranging policy analysis that travels far 
beyond the borders of conventional legal training and that would invite 
precisely the sort of suspicion that Moreno-Ocampo has sought to 
avoid. 
2. Guidelines at the ICC 
It is with this caution in mind that I now to turn to the guidelines that 
the ICC prosecutor has actually endorsed. To date, Moreno-Ocampo’s 
OTP has issued several documents exploring the mandate and weighing 
in on the critical provisions in the Rome Statute. Most relevant to my 
purposes are two documents: a September 2003 policy paper (2003 Pol-
icy Paper) on prosecutorial strategy,163 and a 2007 paper dealing specif-
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ically with the Article 53 “Interests of Justice” standard.164 I consider 
each in turn. 
a. The 2003 Policy Paper 
The 2003 Policy Paper defines “a general strategy for the Office of 
the Prosecutor, highlight[ing] the priority tasks to be performed and de-
termin[ing] an institutional framework capable of ensuring the proper 
exercise of its functions.”165 It is here that the OTP commits itself to the 
principle that “as a general rule, the Office of the Prosecutor should fo-
cus its investigative and prosecutorial efforts and resources on those 
who bear the greatest responsibility, such as the leaders of the State or 
organisation allegedly responsible for those crimes.”166 
The idea that an international war crimes tribunal primarily should 
target top-level officials may seem uncontroversial, perhaps even ob-
vious. Pervading the 2003 Policy Paper is an appreciation of the funda-
mental imbalance underlying the Court’s work: it is an institution with 
highly limited capacity, designed to prosecute crimes that are typically 
committed as mass atrocities.167 Although one may debate whether 
high-level officials are always those who bear greatest responsibility, a 
policy of focusing on such persons seems like a sensible way of nego-
tiating the Court’s limitations. This is also the general course that prede-
cessor tribunals have settled upon, either adopting this position from the 
start (as with Nuremberg and the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda), or settling upon it after high-level suspects became available 
for trial (as with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yu-
goslavia).168 
But does this policy choice tell us something more about the ICC? 
Resource constraints may urge the prosecutor to give priority to the 
highest-level suspects, but they do not prevent the prosecutor from tak-
ing a position on how states should handle wrongdoers that the ICC it-
self cannot process. Moreno-Ocampo might, for example, seek arrest 
warrants against one or two former LRA members who have already 
surrendered and received amnesty under Uganda’s Amnesty Act. Al-
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though the ICC surely could not process every individual who meets 
this description, the targeting of even one such person would send a 
powerful message that Uganda’s amnesty process is inconsistent with 
its obligations under the ICC. 
In so doing, Moreno-Ocampo would be practicing a form of what 
William Burke-White has termed “proactive complementarity.”169 In 
other words, the ICC prosecutor would be using the complementarity 
mechanism to give states guidance as to how they should handle the 
domestic prosecution of international crimes, including crimes that the 
ICC would lack the resources to prosecute on its own.170 Indeed, the fact 
is that some version of proactive complementarity is already embedded 
in the structure of the Rome Statute itself, whether or not the prosecutor 
consciously adopts it as a policy. 
To illustrate this point, consider the following hypothetical scenario. 
The Ugandan authorities apprehend the three living LRA suspects who 
are the targets of outstanding ICC warrants. Rather than deliver the sus-
pects to the ICC, the Ugandan authorities try them in domestic courts, 
resulting in guilty verdicts and life sentences. Acknowledging the pro-
ceedings to be genuine, the ICC drops its warrants. At the same time, 
Uganda goes ahead with mato oput for all remaining LRA perpetrators, 
including ones who have committed crimes within the ICC’s jurisdic-
tion of similar gravity to those committed by the convicted three. 
Should the ICC prosecutor pursue additional cases? If so, what attitude, 
if any, should the ICC take towards the remaining tens of thousands of 
perpetrators? At what point, if any, should the ICC respect Uganda’s 
discretion to prosecute some suspects and not others? In this example, 
neither resource constraints nor a focus on the highest-level suspects 
shield the ICC from the dilemmas of transitional justice. 
Moreno-Ocampo’s public pronouncements confirm his willingness to 
accept domestic prosecutorial efforts that are far from comprehensive. 
The 2003 Policy Paper itself is somewhat ambiguous on this point, but 
it suggests a hands-off approach where lower-level suspects are con-
cerned. It acknowledges that the strategy of targeting only the highest 
leaders will leave an “impunity gap” within which “alternative means 
for resolving the situation may be necessary, whether by encouraging 
and facilitating national prosecutions by strengthening or rebuilding na-
tional justice systems, by providing international assistance to those sys-
tems or by some other means.”171 It concludes simply that “[u]rgent and 
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high-level discussion is needed on methods to deal with the problem 
generally.”172 
In subsequent statements, Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo has gone fur-
ther, explicitly suggesting that alternative justice can complement the 
ICC’s efforts. In particular, a September 2007 paper focusing on Article 
53’s “interests of justice” standard promotes “the complementary role 
that can be played by domestic prosecutions, truth seeking, reparations 
programs, institutional reform and traditional justice mechanisms in the 
pursuit of a broader justice.”173 The paper also notes “the valuable role 
such measures may play in dealing with large numbers of offenders and 
in addressing the impunity gap,” and maintains that “[t]he Office will 
seek to work with those engaged in the variety of justice mechanisms in 
any given situation, ensuring that all efforts are as complementary as 
possible in developing a comprehensive approach.”174 Speaking directly 
to the Ugandan scenario, Moreno-Ocampo similarly expressed that 
“[t]his case in Uganda is to show how traditional mechanisms to recon-
cile people can work together with investigation and prosecution.”175 He 
even went so far as to suggest that Uganda need not prosecute anyone 
except those sought by the ICC: “Basically we are doing a case on four 
people, all the others could be handled using different mechanisms.”176 
As these comments reflect, the focus on high-level offenders is not 
simply a matter of the ICC’s limited resources, but instead demonstrates 
a substantive judgment about how much the ICC should demand of 
states confronting mass atrocities within their borders. Moreno-
Ocampo, it seems, has embraced the view of M. Cherif Bassiouni, Di-
ane Orentlicher, and others that states recovering from mass atrocities 
must, at a minimum, pursue “exemplary trial,” isolating the highest-
level perpetrators of the worst crimes for conventional prosecutions 
while leaving the remaining perpetrators unprosecuted or perhaps em-
ploying alternative justice mechanisms of one sort or another.177 As a 
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means of coming to grips with the ICC’s legitimacy deficit, this ap-
proach has obvious attraction. The policy is relatively objective and 
constraining, making it attractive to those who stress the importance of 
neutral ex ante guidelines. By focusing only on the small group of per-
petrators whose prosecution is presumably most desirable at both the 
domestic and international levels, the policy also extends broad defe-
rence to societies to decide for themselves how best to manage the re-
maining perpetrators and negotiate the dilemmas of political transition. 
At the same time, there is something about this myopic focus on a 
handful of perpetrators that seems unprincipled, even arbitrary. Can it 
really be that the Rome Statute requires Uganda to put an entire peace 
process on hold to force the prosecution of just four—and now possibly 
three—perpetrators, while at the same time expressing juridical indiffe-
rence as to countless other perpetrators who have also committed se-
rious atrocities? This indifference would seem to concede so much to 
the proponents of alternative justice that it undermines the insistence on 
prosecuting the few. In the end, this approach may be more about shiel-
ding the prosecutor from controversial decisions than about providing a 
principled framework for transitional justice, and as the Uganda situa-
tion shows, the policy does not always succeed in avoiding political 
controversy in any event. 
b. The September 2007 “Interests of Justice” Paper 
A key problem in Uganda, of course, is that the tentative peace 
agreement raises the possibility of alternative justice or reduced sanc-
tions for all LRA suspects, including the handful of prosecutions that 
the ICC is pursuing. The issue is not merely that there are so many per-
petrators to prosecute through conventional means, but that, on a more 
fundamental level, it has not seemed possible—at least until recently—
to begin to address the past and secure justice without first concluding a 
peace deal with the very persons targeted by the ICC. In this respect, 
Uganda’s situation may be more like South Africa’s than Rwanda’s, 
with the highest-level offenders able to stand in the way of the initial 
transition that must precede the formal judicial process.178 
The OTP’s 2007 paper on the Article 53 “interests of justice” exemp-
tion to prosecution shows Moreno-Ocampo struggling with this issue, 
which is left unresolved by a focus on exemplary prosecution.179 Here, 
the prosecutor acknowledges that the Rome Statute contemplates defer-
ral of prosecution based on justice interests other than those of tradi-
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tional criminal justice. At the same time, he emphasizes that there must 
be a “presumption in favour of investigation or prosecution” with re-
spect to otherwise admissible cases, that “the criteria for [Article 53’s] 
exercise will naturally be guided by the objects and purposes of the Sta-
tute—namely the prevention of serious crimes of concern to the interna-
tional community through ending impunity,” and that “there is a differ-
ence between the concepts of the interests of justice and the interests of 
peace.”180 Although the paper proceeds to identify specific factors rele-
vant to the analysis—including the gravity of the crime, the interests of 
the victim, and the circumstances of the accused—it provides no con-
crete guidance as to what circumstances, if any, would justify deferral to 
a state in Uganda’s position. Indeed, the paper concludes that “[t]he best 
guidance on the Office’s approach to these issues can be gathered from 
the way it has dealt with real situations. The Office will not speculate on 
abstract scenarios.”181 
Clearly, the OTP has sound reasons to be suspicious of governmental 
avoidance of any meaningful punishment of wrongdoers. If the ICC 
were to defer to amnesties or nonpunitive mechanisms whenever a state 
so requested, the very mission of the Court as a supranational institution 
designed to hold states in check would disappear. And the very nature 
of the logic underlying efforts like South Africa’s TRC reveals that the 
justifications for deferring prosecution rest on a wide-ranging balance of 
interests that is by nature a case-by-case affair. The prosecutor who 
commits to clear ex ante criteria therefore risks being overtaken by po-
litical developments that make alternative justice less desirable. At 
worst, prospective guidelines can provide a road map for states seeking 
to avoid accountability. In other words, the best guidance is to avoid 
meaningful guidelines, and instead leave the question as open-ended as 
it is under the Rome Statute. That solution, however, does nothing to 
address the legitimacy crisis that situations like Uganda present to the 
Court. 
B. Outsourcing Discretion 
With prospective guidelines providing only limited assistance, we re-
turn to the original problem. How can the ICC respond adequately to the 
situation in Uganda without jeopardizing its legitimacy as a legal insti-
tution? To date, Moreno-Ocampo has been steadfast in maintaining the 
Uganda arrest warrants, although his statements on the matter reflect the 
difficulties of having the Prosecutor’s Office make these determinations 
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on a case-by-case basis. I focus here on an episode in late 2006 in which 
the presiding Pre-Trial Chamber, clearly disturbed by reports that the 
Ugandan peace process would circumvent the Court, asked the prosecu-
tion to provide an update on the situation. The resulting document, 
submitted in October 2006, treads carefully, arguing for the mainten-
ance of the warrants without foreclosing the possibility of a future 
change in direction.182 The reasoning of the brief, moreover, suggests at 
least four different approaches, all of which involve taking guidance to 
some extent from external actors. In other words, the intuition may be 
that the Court is not self-legitimating, and that its response to transition-
al justice dilemmas requires the support of external stakeholders. 
1. Pragmatic Accountability to NGOs and UN Officials 
The October 2006 document shows the OTP turning to public state-
ments of UN officials and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to 
support the assertion that lifting the warrants would be imprudent. Thus, 
after recognizing the increasingly weakened status of the LRA, the doc-
ument cites to a statement by Jan Egeland, then-UN Under-Secretary-
General for Humanitarian Affairs, and also to a report by the Interna-
tional Crisis Group in order to conclude that “the role of the existence of 
the warrants in creating pressure upon the LRA leadership has also pub-
licly been acknowledged.”183 In other words, the proposition is that the 
warrants should be maintained because they have applied some of the 
pressure that brought the LRA to the peace table. In another section, the 
document quotes Human Rights Watch’s view that “amnesty or similar 
measures cannot be on the table when it comes to war crimes or crimes 
against humanity,” and it quotes Egeland again for his insistence that 
there “could be no impunity for mass murder and crimes against human-
ity.”184 
On the surface, the OTP makes a good case for maintaining the in-
dictments. To the extent the warrants have facilitated negotiations, it 
would make little sense to remove the pressure from the LRA before a 
final deal is reached. Of course, this logic is in tension with the OTP’s 
argument that amnesty or similar measures should be off the table. To 
the extent the warrants have incentivized the LRA to negotiate, that 
must be because the LRA expects the negotiations will lead precisely to 
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that sort of alternative to international prosecution. Indeed, that is pre-
cisely the argument that the International Crisis Group has advanced, 
maintaining that the arrest warrants must be maintained for purposes of 
pressuring the LRA to the negotiating table, even though, in their view, 
it might be best to forego the warrants eventually as part of a peaceful 
settlement.185 
But putting aside the coherence of the policy as a substantive matter, 
the larger question is whether the opinions of NGOs and other interna-
tional officials are satisfactory sources of decisionmaking authority. The 
OTP has emphasized that “the broader matter of international peace and 
security is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor,”186 but to the extent 
its response to situations like those in Uganda necessarily hinges on 
broader policy judgments, there is an obvious appeal to relying on those 
who may have greater expertise in the area. And, expertise aside, it may 
also be the case that both the moral authority of the ICC and the efficacy 
of its day-to-day operations depend to no small degree on the support of 
these other entities. As Allison Danner has observed, the relationship 
between the ICC prosecutor and the network of NGOs and individual 
states supporting the Court may therefore be one of “pragmatic accoun-
tability” notwithstanding the lack of any formal accountability in the 
Rome Statute itself.187 
The drawback of this approach is equally apparent, however, for rea-
sons that Danner also notes. As she succinctly puts it: “If the Prosecutor 
is accountable in part to NGOs, to whom are NGOs accountable?”188 
Indeed, the proposition is that, by limiting the states’ authority to decide 
questions of transitional justice, the Rome Statute has simply transferred 
that authority to an informal network of actors outside the affected so-
ciety. This is hardly a result that would seem to enhance the credibility 
of the Court’s work. 
2. Listening to the Victims 
A second strategy at work in the OTP’s October 2006 submission is 
assessing the desires of Uganda’s victims. As a result of various provi-
sions in the Rome Statute and the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evi-
dence, victims enjoy the opportunity to participate in proceedings before 
the Court.189 Even more to the point, Article 53 of the Statute identifies 
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the “interests of victims” as one of the factors that the prosecutor should 
take into account when deciding whether a particular investigation or 
prosecution is in “the interests of justice.”190 One might expect that this 
factor would typically favor prosecution,191 but as the Uganda peace 
process reveals, the opposite can also be the case. For example, advo-
cates of alternative justice have relied heavily on the putative interests 
and desires of Uganda’s victims.192 The prosecutor might therefore ap-
pear to be uniquely qualified to take guidance from Uganda’s victims in 
formulating his policies. 
The desirability of victim participation is a hotly debated topic 
among criminal law scholars,193 and the specific question of victim par-
ticipation in ICC proceedings has already consumed a substantial 
amount of litigation, with many questions still unresolved.194 For pur-
poses of my observations here, I do not attempt to enter the broader phi-
losophical debate over the desirability of victim participation. I instead 
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accept at face value the proposition that the ICC’s duty to take victims’ 
interests into account appropriately requires some weight to be given to 
victims’ desires. Nonetheless, the OTP’s analysis reveals the problems 
inherent in identifying and taking victims’ desires into account. 
The problem is roughly two-fold. The first is the difficulty of proper-
ly identifying the desires of large groups of victims; the mass nature of 
atrocities in Uganda ensures that the victims with an interest in the case 
are not isolated individuals, but rather entire populations. Among other 
complications, the number of victims is much larger than could possibly 
participate individually in the ICC’s formal trial or pre-trial procedures. 
Moreover, large groups are sure to reflect a diversity of viewpoints, 
both among individuals and among different populations within the 
group. In Uganda, the greatest support for amnesty and alternative jus-
tice reportedly comes from Kony’s own Acholi people, whereas other 
populations of Ugandan victims—and even distinct segments of the 
Acholi people—are more likely to demand Kony’s prosecution.195 Ad-
ditionally, some victims are not even Ugandan, as evidenced by the 
LRA’s recent atrocities in DR Congo.196 By contrast, alternative justice 
is something of an all-or-nothing proposition. To provide an effective 
inducement, the contemplated scheme requires the ICC to lift the war-
rants completely, and not simply to eliminate charges with respect to 
specific victims who have provided their consent.197 Honoring victims’ 
interests therefore requires a single set of views encompassing the inter-
ests of all victims. This, in turn, requires taking account of a broad range 
of viewpoints and devising a method of weighing those viewpoints in 
pursuit of a single answer. The Rome Statute provides no guidance as to 
how this should be done, and there is indeed no easy answer. 
The OTP has, in fact, undertaken substantial outreach efforts to 
Uganda’s victims, having “conducted more than 25 missions to Uganda 
for the purpose of listening to the concerns of victims and representa-
tives of local communities.”198 Judging from the October 2006 submis-
sion, however, this research has, predictably, failed to produce a defini-
tive answer. The document notes that there have been “strong calls for 
the execution of the warrants to be subjugated to the end of obtaining 
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peace,” but also contests the universality of this sentiment by maintain-
ing that “[r]adio call-in shows in northern Uganda continue to draw a 
diversity of opinions from residents and victims there, including a 
strong view that impunity should not be a price paid for justice.”199 Oth-
ers who have surveyed sentiments among victim populations have simi-
larly reported a diversity of viewpoints.200 The concern is that it may be 
impossible to gauge the victims’ interests in any definitive way and that, 
at worst, appeals to victim sentiment may simply provide a convenient 
means to confirm pre-existing suppositions. 
The second problem concerns the potential contingency of victims’ 
desires on varying assumptions regarding official policies. Although 
there may be broad support among Uganda’s victims for employing ma-
to oput in lieu of traditional prosecutions, that sentiment may itself be a 
product of various assumptions, including the fear that peace will oth-
erwise be impossible to achieve or the belief that the Ugandan govern-
ment is unwilling to commit the resources necessary to defeat the LRA. 
If so, then the interests of the victims may at some level become depen-
dent upon the very policy preferences of the LRA and the Ugandan 
government that are under evaluation by the ICC. There are related 
questions about the degree to which victim preferences are informed. 
Do the supporters of alternative justice mechanisms have a clear under-
standing of the relevant alternatives, or do many victims, crowded in 
refugee camps in remote areas of the country, base their opinions on a 
fundamental misunderstanding of the various options, including, per-
haps, the nature of the ICC itself? 
One example of this phenomenon might explain the results of a 2007 
survey conducted in the eight Ugandan counties most affected by the 
conflict. Although a majority of respondents favored either ICC trials or 
Ugandan trials as the “most appropriate” mechanism to deal with the 
LRA, eighty percent of respondents stated that they preferred peace 
with amnesty to peace with trials.201 As the researchers noted, one poss-
ible explanation for this discrepancy is a lack of faith on the respon-
dents’ part that peace with trials is achievable.202 If so, one might expect 
future answers to a similar survey to change in the event that the Ugan-
dan government did in fact succeed in ending the conflict without am-
nesty. 
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Taken together, these problems raise a fundamental question about 
the legal status of victim preferences. As Leo Zaibert has posed the 
question: Should we be concerned with the opinions of actual flesh-and-
blood victims, or is it better instead to posit ideal victims making ration-
al choices based upon complete information?203 In either event, the task 
of assessing and giving weight to victim preferences in the context of 
mass atrocities is not straightforward. The prosecutor’s hesitancy to po-
sit a single, definitive victim preference reflects these complexities. 
3. Judicializing Discretion 
In addition to the aforementioned strategies, the OTP’s October 2006 
submission also looks to procedural formality as a means of avoiding 
definitive commitments on the dilemmas of the Ugandan peace process. 
Notwithstanding repeated public statements by Ugandan officials evi-
dencing an intent to seek the eventual withdrawal of the warrants in fa-
vor of mato oput, the document emphasizes that as a formal matter, 
“[n]o State or any other entity . . . has sought withdrawal of the war-
rants, nor has any State or any other entity requested any amnesty from 
this Court.”204 In a more recent interview, Moreno-Ocampo has elabo-
rated that: 
To withdraw the warrants there has to be a legal challenge by 
Uganda or the LRA . . . . If someone believes that the traditional 
system is enough to ensure justice and accountability, they can 
challenge the admissibility of the case. It is the defendant and the 
state party who have the responsibility for this and the judges 
will make the final decision.205 
He further stated: “I cannot be a political actor in the talks. I am only a 
judicial actor at the ICC. I have to do my judicial work.”206 
The solution, on this account, is a judicial one. With warrants already 
issued, the prosecutorial role fades into the background, and it is then up 
to the judges to assess whether the case can go forward. If this is indeed 
the prosecutor’s position, the implications for prosecutorial authority are 
dramatic. The prospective nature of the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction en-
sures that warrants are most likely to be issued when mass atrocities are 
in process and prospects for criminal accountability are still dim. The 
most difficult questions of complementarity and interests of justice arise 
later when peace is at hand and the dilemmas of transitional justice rise 
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to the fore. It is precisely at that point that prosecutorial policy has the 
potential to play a more meaningful role. 
It is true, as I have outlined above, that the Rome Statute contem-
plates the litigation of questions pertaining to the admissibility of inves-
tigations or prosecutions, and judicial approval is required for the with-
drawal of existing warrants.207 At the same time, however, the Rome 
Statute gives a prominent role to prosecutorial discretion. Article 53 not 
only requires the prosecutor to satisfy himself of a case’s admissibility 
before commencing an investigation or prosecution. It also allows that 
“[t]he Prosecutor may, at any time, reconsider a decision whether to in-
itiate an investigation or prosecution based on new facts or informa-
tion.”208 While the precise interplay between these various provisions is 
left unclear, one plausible reading is that the Pre-Trial Chamber should 
cancel warrants under Article 58 when so requested by the prosecutor 
under Article 53. At a minimum, the Statute plainly encourages the 
prosecutor to take positions on admissibility issues even after a case has 
gone forward. 
In the event, however, that the prosecutor does leave it completely to 
the Court’s judges to determine the validity of traditional justice in 
Uganda, it is hard to see what exactly the advantage would be. To the 
extent that the dilemmas of transitional justice expose gray areas in the 
Rome Statute that resist reduction to legal norms, the ICC’s judges have 
no greater claim to legitimacy than does Prosecutor Moreno-Ocampo. If 
anything, the prosecutor’s investigative experience on the ground in 
Uganda, including repeated outreach efforts to Uganda’s government 
and its victims,209 would seem to put Moreno-Ocampo at a comparative 
advantage in terms of his ability to balance the equities at stake. 
Recently, the Pre-Trial Chamber overseeing the Uganda cases at-
tempted to force the issue of Ugandan alternative justice by initiating on 
its own motion a proceeding to test the admissibility of the arrest war-
rants.210 The proceeding proved largely inconsequential, however, after 
the Government of Uganda submitted a letter conceding the continued 
admissibility of the case due to the lack of an executed peace agree-
ment, but remaining noncommittal as to how the accused would be han-
dled in the event that the peace process were to succeed.211 The Pre-
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Trial Chamber accordingly maintained the admissibility of the case 
while acknowledging that the issue might well be relitigated later.212 
4. The UN Security Council 
Finally, the October 2006 submission by the OTP to the ICC Trial 
Chamber hints at a fourth possible approach, namely deference to the 
UN Security Council’s views. The Security Council plays only a modest 
role in the prosecutor’s submission, no doubt in part because it has re-
frained from taking a strong position on Ugandan justice. Nevertheless, 
the submission recounts that “the UN Security Council twice has issued 
resolutions referring to the LRA.”213 Security Council Resolution 1653 
urges all States concerned to take action to bring to justice perpetrators 
of grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian 
law,”214 while Resolution 1663 “strongly condemn[ed] the activities 
of . . . the Lord’s Resistence Army.”215 These resolutions do not take 
any specific position on the Ugandan peace process, much less offer ad-
vice on the acceptability of mato oput as a means of addressing past 
criminality. Yet, the prosecutor’s reliance on the Security Council’s res-
olutions, however modest in nature, raises the question of the Council’s 
role in guiding the ICC’s work. 
The idea of appealing to the Security Council’s views is somewhat 
ironic given the history of the ICC. Acting pursuant to its UN Charter 
mandate to safeguard international peace and security, the Security 
Council established the ICC’s most immediate predecessors, the inter-
national criminal tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 
When the International Law Commission released a draft statute for the 
ICC in 1994, it similarly foresaw that ICC investigations and prosecu-
tions would largely depend on referrals from the Security Council.216 
The Rome Statute’s expanded referral system reflects a direct rejection 
of that approach and a determination among many of the negotiating 
states to weaken the Council’s role by ensuring that prosecutions would 
not hinge on that body’s preclearance. The ostensible reason reflects the 
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same concern that I have considered throughout this Article: the so-
called “like minded” states that drove much of the agenda advanced a 
model of the Court driven by legal rather than political considerations 
and argued that mandatory Security Council referral “would reduce the 
credibility and moral authority of the court; excessively limit its 
role; . . . [and] introduce an inappropriate political influence over the 
functioning of the institution.”217 This agenda also likely reflected some 
resentment over the Security Council’s membership and voting rules, 
which grant a veto over Chapter VII decisions to permanent members 
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.218 
Formally speaking, the Rome Statute reduces the Security Council’s 
role in the ICC to two specific functions. First, as it has already done 
with respect to the situation in Darfur, the Council may refer a situation 
to the Court, whether or not the situation involves citizens or territory of 
a state party.219 Second, Article 16 of the Rome Statute provides that 
“[n]o investigation or prosecution may be commenced or proceeded 
with under this Statute for a period of 12 months after the Security 
Council, in a resolution adopted under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, has requested the Court to that effect.”220 The Statute 
further provides that such a “request may be renewed by the Council 
under the same conditions.”221 
For my purposes, however, the issue is not so much the Security 
Council’s formal authority as the Council’s ability to supply a degree of 
legitimacy that the ICC may lack when acting on its own. As the OTP 
has itself expressed, “the broader matter of international peace and secu-
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rity is not the responsibility of the Prosecutor; it falls within the mandate 
of other institutions.”222 International peace and security are the man-
dates of the Security Council under the UN Charter.223 For all its flaws, 
the Council remains, within the largely anarchic international order, the 
international body that has greatest claim to making the kind of complex 
political judgments that the Rome Statute seems to require. 
One can take either an optimistic or pessimistic view of the Council’s 
ability to act in this context. Although the Council remains hobbled by 
its need to draw the concurrence of all five of its permanent members, 
an optimist will take comfort in the fact that this same institutional fea-
ture helps ensure that when the Council does act, its views will reflect a 
broad international consensus, helping perhaps to guarantee both the 
wisdom and legitimacy of its decision. A pessimist will be less sure of 
the Council’s wisdom, seeing in its workings the cynicism of a system 
of power politics that has little to do with the justice interests at the 
heart of the ICC’s mandate. Even from this perspective, however, the 
Council’s intervention has potential to shore up the ICC’s legitimacy. 
The question here is less “Why the Security Council?” than “Who 
else?” The Uganda peace process finds the ICC in a situation—likely to 
be repeated many times in the Court’s future—in which its own authori-
ty seems inadequate to resolve the controversy. The impulse, as evi-
denced so clearly in the October 2006 submission, is to seek legitimacy 
from external actors. The comparative advantage of the Security Coun-
cil is that it possesses definitive authority under both the UN Charter 
and the Rome Statute to pronounce upon the problem. While the result 
may simply be to displace discretion from one international organiza-
tion to another, the politicized nature of the decision seems better suited 
to an institution like the Security Council whose own legitimacy does 
not hinge on the expectation that its decisions will conform to a legalis-
tic, judicial model. 
The legitimizing potential of a Security Council resolution is, of 
course, a two-way street, with the potential to provide guidance both in 
cases where ICC prosecution is deemed desirable and where it is not. 
For example, in the event that the Council were to issue a resolution 
strongly urging the execution of the outstanding warrants, the result 
could simplify the ICC’s task enormously, by effectively removing the 
question of alternative justice from the table (at least with regard to the 
specific individual accused), and bolstering the OTP’s insistence on in-
ternational trials. One can see this dynamic at work in the Court’s Sudan 
investigations, which produced an arrest warrant for Sudan’s sitting 
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head of state, Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir,224 alongside two pre-
viously issued warrants.225 As with Uganda, the Sudan warrants have 
proven controversial on account of their potential to disrupt peace ef-
forts, with many African governments voicing particular opposition to 
the ICC’s involvement.226 But the Council’s referral of the situation to 
the ICC provides a political cover that effectively removes these consid-
erations from the table as far as the ICC itself is concerned. Whatever 
the political consequences of ICC action may be, the organ of the Unit-
ed Nations formally entrusted with matters of peace and security has 
deemed Darfur worthy of the ICC’s attention. Indeed, one might even 
go so far as to agree with George Fletcher and Jens David Ohlin that 
Security Council referrals effectively transform the ICC into a different 
court.227 In such cases, it will still be incumbent upon the Court’s prose-
cutor and judges to conduct a complementarity analysis, but it should be 
one “with greater weight given to the legal determinations made by the 
Council under its law-making authority, and supplanting the regular 
procedures of the ICC as a traditional criminal court operating under 
rules of admissibility.”228 Although Fletcher and Ohlin apply this argu-
ment only to formal Security Council referrals under Article 13(b), the 
basic logic pertains to all ICC cases, whatever the initial source of refer-
ral, regarding which the Security Council has taken a definitive stand. 
Conversely, if the Council were to endorse a comprehensive peace 
deal that trades ICC justice for local solutions, the ICC would be saved 
the potentially delegitimizing consequences of reaching such a decision 
itself. Although many would no doubt disagree with the result, the sus-
pension of the prosecution would not carry the same potential costs for 
the ICC’s own future legitimacy if such deference is forced by the Secu-
                                                          
224. Prosecutor v. Al Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Warrant of Arrest for Omar Hassan 
Ahmad Al Bashir (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc639078.pdf. 
225. See Prosecutor v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ahmad Ha-
run (Apr. 27, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279813.PDF; Prosecutor 
v. Harun, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/07, Warrant of Arrest for Ali Muhammad Ali Kushayb (Apr. 
27, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc279858.PDF. 
226. See, e.g., Colum Lynch, Court Charges Fail to Sideline Sudan, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 
2009, at A13; Marlise Simons & Neil MacFarquhar, Warrant Issued for Sudanese Leader over 
Darfur War Crimes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2009, at A6. In February, for example, the General As-
sembly of the African Union, a regional organization consisting of fifty-three African states 
(comprising all African states except Morocco), issued a resolution requesting that the UN Secu-
rity Council invoke Rome Statute Article 16 to defer the Darfur investigations and prosecutions. 
See Decision on the Application by the International Criminal Court (ICC) Prosecutor for the In-
dictment of the President of the Republic of Sudan, Dec. 221, ¶ 3, Assembly of the African Un-
ion, 12th Sess., Assembly Doc. Assembly/AU/Dec.221(XII), (Feb. 1–3, 2009); see also Member 
States of the African Union, http://www.africa-union.org/root/au/memberstates/map.htm. 
227. George P. Fletcher & Jens David Ohlin, The ICC – Two Courts in One?, 4 J. INT’L 
CRIM. JUST. 428 (2006). 
228. Id. at 431–32. 
2009] COMPLEMENTARITY IN CRISIS 157 
rity Council than might result from the Court reaching that same deci-
sion on its own. 
To be clear, even subscribing to this less optimistic perspective does 
not require reopening the old debate over whether Security Council au-
thorization should be a precondition to ICC intervention in any specific 
matter. The Rome Statute has resolved that debate in favor of prosecu-
torial authority, and that fact has already fundamentally defined the dy-
namic of the ICC. The Court, after all, has moved independently (albeit 
at the original request of Uganda itself) to prosecute LRA crimes, and 
that initiative appears to have played a role in driving the LRA to the 
negotiating table and has likely also influenced the parties to take ac-
countability seriously, even if that accountability comes in the form of 
an alternative justice proposal.229 Any intervention by the Security 
Council at this point will take place in the context of a reality that has 
already been defined in large part by the ICC, which has likely at least 
created inertia in favor of maintaining the existing warrants. 
Of course, there is no guarantee that the Security Council will ex-
press a firm opinion of any kind, and the ICC itself cannot force it to. 
But these observations about the Security Council may nevertheless 
have some consequences for internal ICC policy. For example, the pros-
ecutor might be candid about the difficulties his statutory authority 
creates and affirmatively seek the Council’s assistance on matters such 
as whether to defer to local Ugandan justice. Among other conse-
quences, this attitude might facilitate more active participation by Secu-
rity Council members—the United Kingdom and France in particular—
who are also parties to the ICC and will likely wish to avoid the appear-
ance of obstructing the Court’s work. As regards the Court’s judges, 
these observations counsel in favor of a jurisprudence flexible enough to 
take account of the Council’s views favoring or opposing alternative 
justice, even where the Council’s actions take forms other than the one-
year deferral under Article 16 of the Rome Statute. For example, the 
fact that the Council has referred the Darfur situation to the Court could 
be viewed as a strong indication of the Security Council’s preference for 
international trials over domestic solutions. Sudanese proposals to the 
contrary would therefore be presumptively suspect. 
How have the Uganda arrest warrants fared under this model? In con-
trast to Sudan, the Council’s actions have been tentative and noncom-
mittal about the ICC’s role in a final peace agreement. In both 2006 and 
2007, the Council issued presidential statements regarding Uganda that 
emphasized broadly that “those responsible for serious violations of 
human rights and international humanitarian law must be brought to jus-
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tice . . .” and “that the peace process [must] be concluded expeditious-
ly.”230 Although these sentiments extended some support for the ICC’s 
current course, they gave little direction to the Ugandan government as 
it attempted to navigate the complexities and compromises of peace 
with the LRA. During the spring of 2008, reports emerged that the 
Council was considering an anticipated request from Uganda to defer 
the ICC’s Uganda cases for twelve months while Uganda established its 
own accountability mechanisms following the conclusion of a peace 
deal with the LRA.231 The following month, however, the UN Ambas-
sador for the United Kingdom, a veto-wielding permanent member of 
the Security Council and an ICC state party, publicly opposed any such 
deferral and argued that it was the ICC’s responsibility to determine the 
adequacy of Uganda’s trial arrangements.232 More recently, in Decem-
ber 2008, the Council issued a fresh presidential statement condemning 
recent LRA attacks, but remained more ambiguous than ever on the 
question of legal accountability.233 The statement expressly recalls the 
ICC warrants, but stops short of calling for their execution or even de-
manding a particular form of justice, instead merely emphasizing the 
“vital importance to promoting justice and the rule of law, including re-
spect for human rights, as an indispensable element for lasting peace,” 
and stating that “ending impunity is essential for a society recovering 
from conflict to come to terms with past abuses committed against civi-
lians and to prevent their recurrence.”234 At the same time, the statement 
also declares the Council’s “welcome for the Final Peace Agreement 
(FPA), negotiated between the Government of Uganda and the LRA, 
and reached through the Juba Peace Process” and that it “commends the 
Government of Uganda for its continued commitment to the FPA and its 
investment in the peace process.”235 Of course, as the Council well 
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knows, the peace agreement it praised is one that would circumvent the 
ICC warrants. Although the statement suggests substantial flexibility on 
the Council’s part, more specific guidance will have to wait until a later 
time once the peace process runs its course. 
Thus far then, the Uganda prosecutions remain in the default scenario 
in which the Security Council is largely silent and fails to provide spe-
cific guidance either in favor of or against ICC prosecution. Here, the 
prosecutor’s existing endorsement of exemplary prosecution will miti-
gate tensions with states that are willing at least to prosecute the high-
est-level offenders. But where, as in Uganda, that policy fails to elimi-
nate disputes over the ICC’s authority, the temptation will likely be to 
rely on the pragmatic accountability of NGOs, international officials, 
and perhaps the views of states whose cooperation is especially impor-
tant to the Court. In the end, the most likely impulse will be to continue 
insisting on ICC prosecutions, not necessarily because that will yield the 
most desirable outcome, but because of the institutional difficulty of the 
analysis required to reach a contrary result. Prosecutor Moreno-
Ocampo’s OTP is therefore right to say that the Rome Statute creates a 
presumption in favor of prosecution; further, he has appropriately re-
fused to offer the withdrawal of warrants in favor of domestic Ugandan 
justice.236 But that presumption derives in no small part from the impos-
sibility of the decisions that the Rome Statute asks the Court’s prosecu-
tor and judges to make. Hanging over the ICC’s actions, in other words, 
is a perennial question mark, one that the ICC itself is not institutionally 
capable of removing. 
CONCLUSION: WHAT KIND OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT? 
Where does this analysis leave the ICC and the Ugandan peace 
process? The Court is caught in a difficult position. It is asked to navi-
gate the open spaces of the Rome Statute and the attendant challenges to 
its own legitimacy in contexts that seem to call for as much, if not more, 
open-ended political assessment and balancing than for legal expertise. 
The ICC, it seems, is supposed to provide a check on the independent 
discretion of sovereign states, but the nature of that check and the line 
between state discretion and international obligation remains hopelessly 
murky. 
In the end, the debate over prosecutorial policy in Uganda is funda-
mentally a debate about the nature of the ICC and about how its mission 
should be characterized and its goals realized. Emerging from this dis-
cussion are at least four different models for how the Court might be 
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characterized. I briefly consider each below, and then offer some con-
cluding thoughts. 
First is the concept of the ICC as a constrained and ministerial body, 
charged with the neutral application of well-settled and agreed upon 
principles of international law deemed too serious to be entrusted to po-
litical actors. This vision has dominated much of the public discourse on 
the Court’s work. However, for reasons I have explained, it is actually 
little more than a foundation myth.237 There are simply too many un-
answered questions fundamental to the ICC’s work that are not easily 
reduced to legal rules to support such a narrowly defined role. 
Second is the model of the ICC as a modern administrative agency 
whose constitutive treaty delegates broad policymaking discretion to the 
Court to determine the forms of transitional justice best suited to indi-
vidual societies. The ICC, of course, prosecutes individual cases, and it 
does so pursuant to relatively detailed dictates of substantive interna-
tional criminal law. But the most important decision—whether to trigger 
and maintain a prosecution in light of competing state efforts—is more 
a policy question than anything else. This account is fairly satisfying as 
a descriptive matter, but it also raises difficult questions about the 
Court’s legitimacy and it’s role. Few sympathizers of the Court would 
openly embrace this model, and the prosecutor’s own decision to focus 
narrowly on a handful of high-level suspects reflects deep reluctance to 
enter into this territory. 
A third, more cynical model—one that I have not focused on explicit-
ly in this paper but which perennially lingers beneath the surface—is 
that of an inwardly focused court whose primary concern is not the 
well-being of societies recovering from mass atrocities, but instead the 
maintenance of a docket that will maximize the Court’s own visibility 
and prestige. The Court, after all, is staffed with a group of judges, 
prosecutors, investigators, and other professionals, all of whom presum-
ably are attracted by the opportunity to work for a body that actually 
tries cases. With no Ugandan suspects in custody and only one trial (re-
lating to DR Congo) underway, there is doubtless some degree of pres-
sure to move forward with the Ugandan prosecutions as a means of jus-
tifying the Court’s own existence. One might identify at least some of 
this impulse in Richard Goldstone’s comment that “[i]t would be fatally 
damaging to the credibility of the international court if [Ugandan Presi-
dent] Museveni was allowed to get away with granting amnesty. I just 
don’t accept that Museveni has any right to use the International Crimi-
nal Court like this.”238 Although this impulse is understandable, it is at 
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worst unprincipled, and at best inordinately focused on institutional 
prestige to the exclusion of other values. It is also an impulse publicly 
repudiated by Moreno-Ocampo when he proclaimed that “the absence 
of trials by the ICC, as a consequence of the effective functioning of na-
tional systems, would be a major success.”239 
Fourth, and finally, is the model of the ICC as an incomplete and un-
stable institution, one that has great promise but that must rely on other 
actors to imbue it with the efficacy and legitimacy that it does not inhe-
rently possess. At a certain level, this point is uncontroversial. The ICC 
has no power to apprehend suspects, and its ability to conduct effective 
investigations similarly relies on the cooperation of states and other ac-
tors. But the dilemmas of transitional justice suggest that the Court may 
need to look outside itself even when deciding such deceptively basic 
issues as whether to bring or maintain charges against a particular sus-
pect. 
As I have detailed above, the Rome Statute’s provision for Security 
Council deferrals does, in fact, specifically contemplate a scenario in 
which the priorities of a political body may trump the Court’s work.240 
The lesson of Uganda is not only that Security Council guidance is 
possible, but also that it may be desirable in a great number of cases, 
both as a means of affirming particular local solutions and as a means of 
giving the ICC positive affirmation when national alternatives are in-
adequate. This is a somewhat ironic conclusion given the drafters’ de-
termination to weaken the Security Council’s role by ensuring that pros-
ecutions would not hinge on that body’s preclearance. Yet it does not 
reduce the ICC to the diminished role that the United States originally 
had foreseen for it. As with Uganda, the critical moment may not come 
when the Court first begins to investigate and pursue charges. Instead, it 
may come later, after which the ICC’s work may already have helped to 
stigmatize the wrongdoers, draw international attention to a difficult sit-
uation, and catalyze increased political pressure that is conducive to ne-
gotiation. 
Again, the greatest value is not the pure formality of a Security 
Council mandate, but rather the hope that such action will reflect the 
commitment of the international community to seek and support a just 
and lasting resolution to the Ugandan nightmare. From that perspective, 
the international community’s response heretofore has left much to be 
desired. Speaking in 2003, UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanita-
rian Affairs Egeland lamented that “[t]he conflict in northern Uganda is 
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the biggest forgotten, neglected humanitarian emergency in the world 
today . . . . We the United Nations have also done too little. The donors 
have done too little. The government has done too little, we have all 
done too little.”241 While the hope is that the ICC’s participation can 
help catalyze international commitment to do more, the corresponding 
fear is that the Court will demand too much of Uganda—and other tran-
sitional states—when such commitment does not materialize. 
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